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It is the thesis of this paper that the main causes of the failure of the European 
Constitution result from bad preparation and management of a complex process of 
constitution-making for a union of states of continental proportions. This process 
includes the questions of the temporal aspect of constitution-making, the subjects of 
constitution-making, the strategy of constitutional ratiﬁ cation, the constitution-mak-
ers themselves, and ﬁ nally the very text of the Constitution. Signiﬁ cant discussion on 
these questions is missing, which is wrong, because these constitutional causes of failure 
should be instructive for a possible future European constitution-making process. The 
crucial reasons for the failure of the European Constitution are elaborated as certain 
preliminary propositions. In the author’s opinion, the principal errors of the European 
constitution-making are evident in the beginning of the constitution-making process in 
the moment not suitable for the constitution-making, in the ambiguity of the document 
regarding its constitutional or treaty character, in creating the document completely 
unintelligible to a common citizen, in making the Constitution without vision and 
ambition, in the complete absence of any strategy of constitutional ratiﬁ cation, in 
insisting on direct involvement of the people in the acceptance of the Constitution, 
which was contemplated legally and politically principally as an international treaty, 
and in a poorly managed media presentation and defence of the Constitution before 
the European public. The most important of them is an ambivalent approach of the 
European constitution-makers to the method of ratiﬁ cation of their Constitution. The 
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next most important error is that they have not made use of comparative experiences 
of constitution-making of other federal unions.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2002 in Brussels the Convention on the Future of Europe 
started and it declared very soon that it would aim at making a comprehensive 
European constitution, or at least a constitutional treaty.1 Following the ﬁ nish-
ing of the preliminary draft of the Constitution in June 20032, and the hardly 
achieved agreement of the European Council on the ﬁ nal constitutional proposal 
which would be sent to the Member States for ratiﬁ cation in October 2004, 
this most signiﬁ cant, comprehensive and longest constitution-making process 
of the European Union3 seems deﬁ nitely to be stuck on the ﬁ nal obstacle - the 
acceptance of the people in the referendums in France and Holland.
1 The ofﬁ cial name of the Convention’s document is ‘The Treaty on establishing the Con-
stitution for Europe’, but most often the document is called “constitution” or “constitu-
tional treaty”. 
2 On the Constitution for the European Union and the Convention on the Future of Eu-
rope see especially Siniπa Rodin, Ustav Europe - individualna prava umjesto demokracije 
i federalizma (The Constitution of Europe - Individual Rights instead of Democracy and 
Federalism), Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 51, No. 1,2001, pp. 153-156; 
Branko Smerdel, Temeljni problemi ustavnog izbora u Europskoj uniji - Pokuπaj prelimi-
narne prosudbe rezultata Konvencije o buduÊnosti Europe (Fundamental Problems of 
Constitutional Choice in the European Union - An Attempt at Preliminary Assessment 
of the Results of the Convention on the Future of Europe), Zbornik Pravnog fakulte-
ta u Zagrebu, Vol. 53, No. 3-4, 2003, pp. 509-527; Robert Podolnjak, Dvije ustavne 
konvencije: SliËnosti i razlike izmeu Philadelphije i Bruxellesa (Two Constitutional 
Conventions: Similarities and differences between Philadelphia and Brussels), Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2003, pp. 1115-1188. See also many valu-
able articles dedicated to the Draft Constitution in the thematic ﬁ rst issue of European 
Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 1, January 2005.
3 See Mathias Jopp and Saskia Matl, Die Europäische Verfassungsvertrag als Höhepunkt 
im Prozess der Konstitutionalisierung der EU- eine Einführung, in Jopp and Matl eds., 
Dere Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa: Analysen zur Konstitutionalisierung der 
EU, Nomos, Baden, 2005, pp. 15-41.
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After more than three years’ work on the European constitutional project, 
the prevailing opinion is that the “constitution is dead”.4 According to The 
Economist, “the decisive French and Dutch noes have killed the constitution stone 
dead”.5 For comparison, the highly successful American constitution-making 
process, as remarked by the distinguished historian Jack Rakove, lasted less than 
two years, taking into account the period from the unsuccessful convention in 
Annapolis in September 1786 until the ratiﬁ cation of the Constitution by the 
11th state New York in July 1788.6
“The death penalty” to the European constitution was brought in two 
referendums in the interval of a few days. In France, the Constitution lost 
when the majority of about 55% voted against it on May 29, 2005, and then 
on June 1 the people in the Netherlands, with even greater majority (61.6 to 
38.4%) voted against the document. As Article 447 of the Draft prescribes that 
the Constitution has to be ratiﬁ ed by all the Member States, in accordance 
with their constitutional requirements, it is clear that the Constitution cannot 
come into force in case of non-ratiﬁ cation even by a single country.7 In the 
case of earlier treaties of Maastricht and Nice there were repetitions of refer-
endums (in Denmark and Ireland) to save these treaties from failure, but now 
there is not much speaking of putting the Constitution, in its present shape, 
once again before the French and Dutch people.8 There are some politicians, 
4 This remark of the British opposition politician Liam Fox after two referendums would 
be very soon accepted by many European politicians and analysts in numerous EU mem-
ber states. See The Future of the European Constitution, House of Commons Research 
paper 05/45, 13 June 2005, p. 10.
5 The Europe that died, The Economist, June 4th 2005.
6 Rakove, Europe’s ﬂ oundering fathers, Foreign Policy, September/October 2003, pp. 28-
38.
7 Just because of that some states, like Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Poland and oth-
ers, suspended their plans for ratiﬁ cation for an unlimited period. As remarked sarcasti-
cally by The Economist “to insist that the Danes, Irish, Poles, British and others must still 
vote is like asking doctors to operate on a corpse in the vain hope of resurrecting it”. The 
Europe that died, The Economist, June 4th 2005.
8 The then Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel suggested in an interview that the Con-
stitution could be put again to a vote in France and Holland in two years’ time. In that 
period, according to his opinion, European politicians could try to answer numerous 
criticisms to the citizens in these countries, and referendums would be held probably 
in a different political landscape. See Austrian leader suggests re-run of EU constitution 
polls, EUObserver, 16 Aug 2005.
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especially in Germany, Austria, and other countries, which have ratiﬁ ed the 
Constitution, insisting on the continuation of the ratiﬁ cation process. However, 
there are equally strong voices in France, the Netherlands, and some other 
countries deﬁ nitely dismissing the Constitution as it stands now and refusing 
to continue with ratiﬁ cation or to repeat it in France and/or the Netherlands. 
The probable result of these differences would be, in my opinion, a status quo, 
which means a semi-ratiﬁ ed Constitution.9 British The Economist was the ﬁ rst 
to predict failure of the European constitution, so I accept its opinion on the 
possibility of the ratiﬁ cation of the existing constitutional text: “(S)ticking 
with the whole constitution and nothing but the constitution will make it 
even harder to rescue any of its useful bits. It would surely be easier to try to 
carve up the corpse for the organs, rather than to try to jolt the whole thing 
lumberingly back to life”.10
In numerous comments following the referendums in France and Holland, 
it could be read about many reasons and causes that inﬂ uenced the people in 
these two countries to vote against the Constitution.11 In the special report 
for the House of Commons made in June 2005 there are the following reasons 
given for the negative opinion on the Constitution:
9 On numerous options debated in political and scientiﬁ c circles across Europe after the 
Constitution’s ratiﬁ cation standstill, see Udo Diedrichs and Wolfgang Wessels, Die Eu-
ropäische Union in der Verfassungsfalle? Analysen, Entwicklungen und Optionen, Inte-
gration, 28. Jahrgang, October 2005, pp. 287-306; Daniel Göler and Mathias Jopp, Die 
europäische Verfassungskrise und die Strategie des ‘langen Atems’, Integration 2/2006, 
s. 91-105; Peter Häberle, Juristische und politische Konsequenzen des doppelten Neins 
von Frankreich und Holland zur EU-Verfassung, Vortrag am 16. Jun. 2005., Walter Hall-
stein Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, FCE 5/03 and the contributions sub-
mitted on the symposium “The Future of constitutional process of the EU” organized in 
October 2005 by the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs (avail-
able at (http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/organes/afco/afco_20051013_
1500_symposium.htm).
10 Back from the dead, The Economist, January 7th, 2006. In the article with the same title 
The Guardian says, “the EU is divided over ministering the last rites to its failed constitu-
tion, or resurrecting it in some form next year”, The Guardian, December 22, 2005.
11 See Grainne de Burca, After the Referenda, European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2006, 
pp. 6-7; Editorial Comments, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, 2005, pp. 905-911; 
and collection of articles on negative referenda on EU Treaties in European Constitu-
tional Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2005, pp. 335-428.
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- erosion of national sovereignty and national identity,
- general uneasiness with the EU,
- amount of legislation from Brussels and the increasing number of policy 
areas,
- Turkish accession to the EU,
- Anglo - Saxon economic liberalism reducing the focus on “social Europe”,
- globalisation,
- loss of national inﬂ uence in Europe,
- EU integration going too fast,
- EU inﬂ uence over issues close to citizens,
- the EU is undemocratic,
- the euro.12
The post-referendum survey of the main reasons of pro at contra voting of 
French citizens shows that the most important reason for the ‘yes’ vote has 
been based on the consideration that the Constitution is essential for pursu-
ing the European construction. On the other hand, the main reasons for the 
‘no’ vote have been based chieﬂ y on national and/or social themes such as: the 
Constitution will have negative effects on the employment situation in France 
(relocation of French enterprises and loss of jobs), poor economic situation in 
the country, draft Constitution is too liberal and/or is not social enough, op-
portunity to vote against the president of the Republic and the government 
etc. As regards the key element, which determined how they voted, the French 
citizens were divided between those favouring European integration and those 
thinking foremost of the economic and social situation in France. 
What is especially important for me is one of the survey’s ﬁ ndings that the 
opinion on the actual text of the European Constitution motivated only one 
ﬁ fth of all voters in France.13 The post-referendum survey in Holland shows 
some similar ﬁ ndings. The primary motivation of the ‘yes’ voters was - the same 
as in France - the essential role of the Constitution in pursuing the European 
construction. However, motivations of the ‘no’ voters were different in Holland. 
The most important reasons for voting against the Constitution were the lack 
of information, loss of national sovereignty, opposition to national government 
12 The Future of the European Constitution, House of Commons Research Paper, 05/45, 
13 June 2005, p. 14.
13 The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France, Flash Eurobarometer 
171, June 2005, pp. 16-20.
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and expensiveness of Europe.14 Some analysts think that the Dutch voters have 
used the referendum to express their opposition to rapid European integration 
(the euro, eastern enlargement, the start of negotiations with Turkey), because of 
the feeling that small states are loosing their inﬂ uence in the EU and especially 
because of large ﬁ nancial contributions of Holland to the EU budget. The same 
as in France, the opinion on the text of the Constitution was the key element 
for only one-ﬁ fth of the Dutch voters.15
All these reasons and many others have inﬂ uenced the decision of vot-
ers in these states. Partly, they are common to all the states which have held 
a referendum - a signiﬁ cant number of citizens opposed the latest ‘eastern 
enlargement’ of the EU, so that referendums in certain countries were partly 
referendums on past enlargement and at the same time referendums against 
the future enlargement (Turkey). Many citizens have voted against the Con-
stitution showing in that way their deep distrust or disagreement towards the 
EU institutions and policies. Predominantly, citizens were motivated by the 
internal political situation, speciﬁ c in each country, and less by the so-called 
‘European themes’. Only a small proportion of all voters did in fact vote ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ thinking primarily of the text of the Constitution. 
Because of that, we may have the impression that the very Constitution 
is not to be blamed at all. It just came as a symbol of people’s dissatisfaction 
with their government and the economic situation in their country, or their 
distrust towards a distant supranational bureaucracy. It would be wrong, in my 
opinion, to search for the failure of the European Constitution in these causes, 
because they are only indirectly related to the Constitution. For example, op-
position of citizens to the entry of Turkey in the EU does not have to be the 
reason of their voting against the Constitution, because that document does 
not change the rule that each Member State still has the veto on accession of 
new states to the EU.16 
It is the thesis of this paper that the main causes of the failure of the Eu-
ropean Constitution are resulting from bad preparation and management of 
14 The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in The Netherlands, Flash Euroba-
rometer 172, June 2005, pp. 16-20.
15 Dutch nees up, The Economist, June 4th 2005.
16 Article I-58 of the draft Constitution prescribes that the European Council must unani-
mously adopt the decision on the acceptance of the new Member State, and the condi-
tions of admission have to be settled in the agreement of the candidate state and Mem-
ber States. This agreement has to be ratiﬁ ed by all Member States, according to their 
constitutional requirements.
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a complex process of constitution-making for a union of states of continental 
proportions. Those causes are directly related to the process of creation of a 
constitution. They include the questions of the temporal aspect of constitu-
tion- making, the subjects of constitution-making, the strategy of constitutional 
ratiﬁ cation, the constitution-makers themselves, and ﬁ nally the text of the 
Constitution. On these questions signiﬁ cant discussion is missing, which is 
wrong, because the constitutional causes of the failure should be instructive for 
a possible future European constitution-making process. These, in my opinion, 
crucial reasons for the failure of the European Constitution will be elaborated 
as certain preliminary propositions. These propositions could be seen also as 
a piece of advice to future European constitution-makers. 
The crucial mistake of the European constitution-makers (both in the Con-
vention and in the Intergovernmental Conferences) lies in their ambivalent ap-
proach to the method of ratiﬁ cation of their Constitution: majority of them have 
insisted on the new constitutional terminology and quality of the document, but 
at the same time they did not have courage or cleverness to devise a ratiﬁ cation 
procedure suitable for this kind of document. Instead they left to each Member 
State to choose its own way to ratify the Constitution, which decision has resulted 
in the disastrous choice by the French and Holland’s politicians. The next most 
important mistake of the European constitution-makers, in my opinion, was that 
they did not make use of comparative experiences of constitution-making in the 
other federal systems, notably American and Swiss, regarding their solutions to 
the problem of ratiﬁ cation of the constitution in a union of many member states. 
Had they done that, they would probably have arrived at some different solutions, 
especially as to the constitutional ratiﬁ cation procedure.
PROPOSITION NO. 1: THE MISSING EUROPEAN 
“CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT” 
My ﬁ rst proposition is that the process of European constitution-making 
did not happen in a truly constitutional moment, i.e. in the period that would 
be generally favourable to constitution-making.17
17 When we speak of the “constitutional moment” it should be pointed out that it does not 
have to be a short, instantaneous period. It might last even for a few years.
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The theory of ‘constitutional moments’ has been formulated by Professor 
Bruce Ackerman, who had in mind the American constitutional history. His 
theory of ‘constitutional moments’ supposes that the process of ‘higher law-
making’ or constitutional politics occurs in the “moments of grave crisis”18, or 
in the crucial transformative periods in the development of a society.
Compatible to the theory of ‘constitutional moments’ is a theory that 
would like to prove that the time element in constitution-making is crucially 
important, i.e. that there are certain periods in the political development of a 
society when it is ripe to engage in the process of constitution-making. Profes-
sor Edward McWhinney was the ﬁ rst one to elaborate this thesis in his clas-
sic work Constitution-making. He has argued that the “successful acts of legal 
codiﬁ cation” almost invariably occur in or immediately after a period of “great 
public excitement”, when there exist “a certain climate of popular political 
consensus”. These periods are especially characterized by great political crises: 
post-war reconstructions (be it after victorious war or great military defeats), 
political or social revolutions, successful wars of national self-determination 
and independence and similar social and political transformations.19 Similarly, 
Kenneth Wheare ﬁ nds the origins of modern constitutions, almost without 
exemption, in the wish of the people to make a fresh start.20
Numerous examples conﬁ rm these theses. In the American case, the Arti-
cles of Confederation were proposed, debated and accepted during the war of 
independence. The Constitution of 1787 resulted from military, diplomatic 
and commercial weaknesses of the Confederation, but also because of internal 
political upheavals in certain states. Afterwards, three very important constitu-
tional amendments, ratiﬁ ed after the Civil war, inaugurated what many analysts 
call ‘the second republic’. In Germany, all the important acts of constitution-
-making resulted from some political or military upheaval - in 1849 after the 
revolution, in 1871 after German uniﬁ cation, the Weimar Constitution of 1919 
after the defeat in the First World War, and ﬁ nally the Basic Law of 1949, after 
another military catastrophe. Each signiﬁ cant period of political development 
in France was accompanied by a constitution, which marked that era - from 
18 Bruce Ackerman, Our Unconventional Founding, University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol. 62, No. 2, 1995, p. 476.
19 Edward McWhinney, Constitution-making: Principles, process, practice, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1981, pp. 14-19. See also Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in 
the Constitution-making Process, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 45, 1995-6, pp. 370-1.
20 Kenneth Wheare, Modern Constitutions, Oxford University Press, London 1951, p. 9.
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the ﬁ rst Constitution of 1791 to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. Of 
course, we must not forget the latest wave of constitution-making in all post-
-communist democracies of central and Eastern Europe. We could ﬁ nd many 
more examples.
If this is so could we, in the case of European constitution-making, speak 
of the ‘European constitutional moment’, analogous to the American one of 
1787? Could we speak of the European crisis that could be stimulative in the 
process of constitution-making? Is Europe in an era of a new beginning, which 
demands deﬁ ning new constitutional rules? There has been at no time a schol-
arly and political consensus achieved on these questions.
Thinking of this ‘constitutional moment’ in modern Europe, of this new 
beginning, some analysts ﬁ nd it in the admission of ten new countries to the 
EU.21 It is the greatest enlargement of the European Union up to now as to the 
number of new Member States. At the same time we can speak, in the words 
of Timothy Garton Ash, of the greatest ‘enlargement of freedom’, of the most 
successful project of the EU since the time of WW II. We should also have in 
mind that this project is not ﬁ nished, and that this logic of enlargement still 
works like a magnet on numerous European and quasi-European countries. 
Where are, actually, the ﬁ nal borders of the EU? No one can answer that at 
this moment. How many states, at the end, might be Member States of the 
EU? According to some predictions, we could have as much as 32 or even 34 
states in the Union.22
Other analysts of the newest European constitutional project will argue 
that we could in no way speak of a classical constitutional moment, because 
21 Vernon Bogdanor, The new Constitution: Does Europe need it?, National Liberal Club, 
May 17, 2004., available at http://www.cfr.uk.Events/Seminars%20and%20Lectures/
Transcript/doc. Some would even insist that “the raison d’etre for the constitutional treaty 
was EU enlargement”. See Susan Watkins, Editorial: Continental tremors, New Left 
Review, No. 33, May-June 2005, s. 14.
22 In addition to then 25 existing Member States and four candidate states (Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Croatia and Turkey) Garton Ash expects that in the next twenty years, some 
other Balkan states (Serbia, independent Montenegro, possibly Kosovo) and former 
states of the Soviet Union (Ukraine and Byelorussia) could become members of the EU. 
He thinks even possible that in the near future there comes to a break-up of several exist-
ing Member States (and so we could have Flandria and Valonia instead of Belgium, or 
separation from the existing states (e.g. Scotland or Baskia). See Timothy Garton Ash, 
Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West, Random House, 
New York, 2004, pp. 191-192.
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it was not preceded by any war, revolution, or some other social upheaval. So 
it is doubtful if “the historical ‘big bangs’ which established constitutions in 
the past (can) be reproduced in a period of peaceful change for a European 
constitution”.23 It was also perceived that the European constitution was cre-
ated “without much popular or other enthusiasm and it is not going to consti-
tutionalize ordinary politics”, but what is even more important, without the 
blessing of a constitutional moment we could hardly expect “creating union 
and identity”.24 
It is paradoxical, actually, if we look at the ‘eastern enlargement’ of the EU 
as a real constitutional moment, suitable for creation and ratiﬁ cation of the 
European constitution, that this event has played a very negative role in the 
mood of citizens of the “older Member states” towards the Constitution. In all 
surveys of public opinion in the ‘older’ Member States the enlargement of the 
Union was one of the major reasons of antagonism towards the Constitution, 
and, as I said earlier, the referendums in several states were partly disguised 
referendums on ‘eastern enlargement’, and at the same time referendums of 
opposition to the future enlargement (Balkans, Turkey, Ukraine).25 Besides 
this, it should be pointed out that the enlargement, as a possible trigger of the 
23 Kalypso Nicolaidis and Stephen Weatherill, Whose Europe? National Models and the 
Constitution of the European Union: Introduction, European Studies at Oxford, 2003, 
pp. 6-7. See also Ingolf Pernice, The Draft Constitution of the European Union: A Con-
stitutional Treaty at a Constitutional Moment?, in Pernice and Maduro eds., A Consti-
tution for the European Union: First Comments on the 2003 - Draft of the European 
Convention, NOMOS Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2003, pp. 13-21.
24 Sajo, Constitutional Enthusiasm towards the European Constitution?, p.1. See also 
Philippe C. Schmitter, Constitutional Engineeing by ‘Process’ not ‘Product: Which Eu-
rope will come out of the Convention, in Nicolaidis and Weatherill, Whose Europe?, pp. 
28-30.
25 Public survey in the EU countries in the spring 2005 showed that in several ‘older’ 
Member States (EU-15) there existed a very sceptical mood for further enlargement of 
the EU. Only 32% of the examinees in France and 45% in the Netherlands said they ap-
proved of further enlargement, which explains the inﬂ uence of this theme on voters later 
on in the constitutional referendums. However, in many other ‘older’ Member States, 
like Germany, Austria, Luxemburg, Finland, Denmark and the UK, only the minority of 
examinees would say that they approve of further enlargement. On the other hand, the 
citizens in ‘newer’ Member States approve of further enlargement in much higher per-
centages. See Eurobarometer 63, Spring 2005, Public Opinion in the European Union, 
July 2005, p. 27.
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constitution-making process, has not, unfortunately, served as a cause for con-
structive adjustment of the EU institutions to the conditions of a much larger 
number of Member States. A partly different institutional framework of the 
EU (composition of the European Commission, the president of the European 
Council) has not been well accepted in a larger part of the Union, especially 
in the smaller states, and that would have a reﬂ exion on the reception of the 
Constitution in the Europe’s public. It is clear, then, that the enlargement of the 
EU constituted, against all expectations, an anti-constitutional moment.26 
There is still another paradox. Namely, that in the ﬁ rst phase of the con-
stitution-making process, dominated by the political elites, we had a constitu-
tion without a constitutional moment, and today, after several referendums 
(especially in France and the Netherlands) and intense debate in the public 
about the ‘European project’ in numerous countries, we have a constitutional 
moment, but the constitution is missing.27
The absence of the constitutional crisis or a genuine constitutional moment 
in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century does not mean that an attempt 
at ratifying a European constitution would be unsuccessful in advance regard-
less of other factors, but it means that the constitution-makers cannot expect 
a positive climate around the constitution-making process. There would be no 
consensus in the public regarding the necessity and the content of a constitu-
tion. The opponents of such a constitution would be more easily mobilized 
than its probable supporters. In such a situation, a popular referendum would 
not be a good idea. A constitution made without the help of a constitutional 
moment would require low-proﬁ le ratiﬁ cation. Therefore, I would prefer a 
more pragmatic solution - parliamentary ratiﬁ cation wherever possible. First 
of all, I would recommend a symbolic declaration of the European Parliament 
accepting the Draft Constitution and afterwards quick ratiﬁ cation by national 
parliaments, perhaps with an additional condition of a 2/3 majority of all rep-
resentatives voting for the constitution to be valid. According to the national 
constitutional requirements only in Ireland and Denmark there would be nece-
26 On the enlargement of the EU as a possible constitutional moment and motive of 
constitution-making see more in Robert Podolnjak, Stvaranje europskog ustava kao 
‘kvaziustavni trenutak’ (The Creation of the European Constitution as a ‘Quasi-Con-
stitutional Moment), Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 55, No. 6, 2005, pp. 
1423-1460.
27 See Kalypso Nicolaidis, UE: Un moment tocquevillien, Politique etrangere, No. 3/2005, 
p. 499.
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ssary to conduct a popular referendum. The problem of the possible rejection 
and the possible solutions would be discussed later on.
 
PROPOSITION NO. 2: THE FUNDAMENTAL AMBIGUITY OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION
Already in the ﬁ rst comments of the draft of the ﬁ rst 16 articles of the 
European constitution, published in February 2003, it was concluded that it 
was an ambiguous document in view of its basic character, i.e. whether it was 
a treaty or a constitution.28 In the process of adoption of the EU constitution 
this confusing terminology would prove to be very important. 
As indicated by the analysts of the European constitution, this document 
was substantively not different from all the other treaty changes in the history 
of the EU.29 Looking at the Articles of the Constitution and the principles of its 
ratiﬁ cation we would not ﬁ nd anything revolutionary. What was revolutionary 
28 The author of the Editorial comments in the distinguished Common Market Law Review 
would be one of the ﬁ rst to comment this ambiguity of terminology of the document 
worked upon by the Brussels Convention: “The February text, like the October one, 
refers to a ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’. Elsewhere, it refers to ‘the 
Constitutional Treaty’ and the ‘Constitution’.This terminology can either be considered 
to be elegant - or a fudge. It is elegant in so far as it is deliberately ambiguous: it com-
bines the elements of a Constitution and a Treaty. However, if Europe is indeed to have 
a Constitution, then it would gain immensely in terms of legitimacy and transparency 
by acknowledging this fact openly, by calling the basic document ‘The Constitution of 
Europe’ or some such name. This would send a powerful symbolic message to Member 
States, their Parliaments and courts, and to the outside world, but above all to the 
citizens of the EU. It would declare unambiguously the creation of a new polity…The 
relationship between the Constitution itself and the Treaty in which it is contained also 
needs to be examined and considered. This raises a basic question: which is the funda-
mental text - the treaty or the Constitution? If it is the former, then one recognizes the 
public international law nature of the EU and the primary role of the Member States. If 
it is the latter, one is clearly sending a message that the Union derives its legitimacy from 
a Constitution - one to which all its citizens could subscribe”. See Editorial comments 
- The sixteen articles: On the way to a European Constitution, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 40, 2003, pp.268-9.
29 See Bruno de Witte, Treaty Revision in the European Union: Constitutional Change 
Through International Law, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 35, 2004, 
pp. 51-84.
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was only the language of this particular treaty reform - ‘constitutional conven-
tion’, ‘constitution-makers’, ‘constitution’ or ‘constitutional treaty’.
Before, only judges and scholars spoke of European treaties as a ‘constitu-
tional charter’, but since the Laeken Declaration this constitutional terminology 
has been accepted by numerous politicians as well.30 Joseph Weiler especially 
emphasizes the crucial meaning of the new terminology: “The deﬁ ning feature 
of Europe’s new constitution is a word, an appellation. It is not the content 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that gives it epochal sig-
niﬁ cance but the fact that an altogether run-of-the-mill treaty amendment has 
been given the grand name of Constitution”.31
There are a number of characteristics of the document indicating that it is 
partly a treaty, and partly a constitution. The following characteristics indicate 
the treaty nature of the EU constitution:
- the length and detail of the document, 
- the right of each Member State to withdraw from the EU,
- unanimity in the process of amending the document,
- the possibility that some Member States integrate more quickly or com-
prehensively than others,
- the source of legal authority is not “we the people” but the Member 
States32,
- the people will not ratify the Constitution through conventions or in a 
referendum.
On the other hand, some characteristics would point in favour of the con-
stitutional nature of the document:
- the document establishes complex organs of government,
- it grants that government vast authority to control the lives of Europeans 
30 Thomas Christiansen, Constitutionalizing the European Union: The Power of Language, 
EU Constitution Project Newsletter, July 2004, pp. 7-8
31 Weiler, On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 3, No. 2/3, 2005, p. 173.
32 The preamble of the European constitution speaks nowhere of people as a subject of 
constitution making. Because of that Larry Siedentop shall, some time before the end of 
the Brussels’ convention, suggest the following text of the preamble: “We, the peoples 
of Europe adopt the following constitutional treaty for encouraging a more perfect, vol-
untary union of our nation-states…” See Siedentop, We the people do not understand, 
Financial Times, June 4, 2003. Any similarity with the preamble of the American consti-
tution is not accidental.
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by legislating ‘harmonized’ statutes directly applicable to the individuals 
in many areas of community life, 
- the proposed constitution, ﬁ nally, declares to be a constitution, not a 
treaty.33
The crucial question in the constitutional law sense, then, is whether the 
European Convention has proposed a treaty, a constitution, or, in Giscard’s 
words, a constitutional treaty.
Numerous scholars would argue that there are two basic criteria of a ‘true’ 
constitution. The ﬁ rst is, whether the amendment procedure in the new con-
stitutional document insists on the unanimity of all Member States for adop-
tion of the constitution or whether it allows that the amendment is adopted 
by a certain qualiﬁ ed majority, and the second criteria relates to the type and 
measure of popular involvement in the process of adoption of the constitu-
tion.34 Some scholars think that there is still another important distinguishing 
characteristic between an international organization and a federal state. The 
question is who has the power of amending the document. According to the 
existing treaties, Member States are the only “masters of the treaties”. If the 
future amending procedure would change in the way that future amendments 
would depend on the formal proposal of the European Convention and/or the 
33 See Stephen G. Breyer, Competing Models in the Proposed Constitution, in Esther 
Brimmer ed., The European Union Constitutional Treaty: A Guide for Americans, Cen-
ter for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, 2005, pp. 37-8.
34 According to Joseph Weiler, “unanimity, embodying the principle of sovereign equal-
ity and consent is typically a hallmark of internationalism, not constitutionalism”. His 
thesis is that “almost any Europe-wide plebiscite which calls on the peoples of Europe, 
as such, to approve the constitution would be of huge legal and political signiﬁ cance and 
transformative of current European constitutionalism”. On the other hand, he thinks, 
approval of the constitution by the peoples of Europe in their status as national com-
munities would afﬁ rm only the constitutional status quo, no matter what the document 
says. Weiler essentially follows Madison’s theses elaborated in the Federalist No. 39 
(See Isaac Kramnick ed., The Federalist Papers, Penguin Books, 1987, pp. 256-7, 259). 
See J.H.H. Weiler, A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2002, p. 565. But, differently than Weiler, Madison nev-
er thought that the fact that the American Constitution was adopted as a federal act, as 
an act of sovereign states, means that it should not be called a constitution. For Madison 
it meant only that the American Constitution is a constitutional compact. Most of the 
American Founding Fathers saw no contradiction in the phrase “constitutional compact” 
which is very similar to the “constitutional treaty”.
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European Parliament then, according to this opinion, the essential shift to a 
formal constitution would be made.35
However, even German analysts, very much devoted to the federal principle 
in constructing the European Union, could not agree on the constitutional 
or treaty nature of the Convention’s document.36 Joschka Fischer had argued 
even before the Convention that “however you name it - Constitution, Treaty, 
or whatever - in fact it will be a Constitution”.37 But, the former judge of the 
German Constitutional Court Prof. Dieter Grimm, would categorically claim 
that the European constitution “is not a real Constitution”. It is only an inter-
national treaty (ein völkerrechlicher Vertrag), changing in no way the legal nature 
of the EU as it was deﬁ ned by the Treaties of Rome. What is confusing for the 
European public and leads it to believe that the European Convention really 
made a constitution is the indisputable fact that by the EU treaties many func-
tions were taken over, which in the Member States are in the constitution’s 
domain. Nevertheless, what indisputably separates a constitution from a treaty 
is, according to Grimm, “the principle of legitimacy”. The constitutions arise 
from the citizens as the source of all public power. They emanate from the 
people, or by mandate of the people, or could be at least attributed to the 
people. In this sense, says Grimm, the European constitution is not a genuine 
constitution.38 
Ralf Dahrendorf would similarly claim that “the strange document” called 
the European Constitution “is technically not a constitution”, because it no-
where declares “We, the people of Europe…”. So, for him it appears that the 
EU is producing a document that claims to be far more than it actually is.39
In France and the U.K. the treaty dimension of the document would also 
be emphasized. The French delegate to the Convention Robert Badinter stated 
35 See De Witte, Simpliﬁ cation and Reorganization of the European Treaties, Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2002, pp. 1282-3.
36 See Jürgen Schwarze, The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - Some General 
Reﬂ ections on its Character and its Chances of Realisation, European Public Law, Vol. 
12, No. 2, 2006, pp. 199-211.
37 Fischer’s speech at the EUI in Florence on 17th January 2002, available at http://www.
iue.it/About/News/Pdf-ﬁ les/Fischerspeech.pdf.
38 Dieter Grimm, Der Vertrag, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 109, 12 May 2005, p. 
6.
39 Ralf Dahrendorf, Comment: The Constitution of Europe, Daily Times, January 5, 
2005.
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that the Convention negotiates an international treaty, not deliberating about a 
constitution.40 Gisela Stuart, the British member of the Convention’s Presidency, 
would clearly stress: “To me this is a treaty that will come into force when it is 
ratiﬁ ed by all the Member States. Whether or not it calls itself a constitution, 
its mechanism of ratiﬁ cation is that of a treaty - end of story”.41
It is evident then that the acceptance of the constitutional terminology 
in the Convention’s document, although an important step in the history 
of European integration, would have more political and symbolic than legal 
signiﬁ cance. The constitutional vocabulary used by the Convention was not 
an exercise of constitutionalization, but only of constitutional rewriting and 
formalization.42 
The problem was that the Eurosceptics fought against the European Con-
stitution exactly because of its constitutional ideas and terminology, as the 
new name would suggest and strengthen the claim that the European Union 
is moving towards a sort of a super-state, namely a centralized statal polity.43 
On the other hand, by calling the newest European treaty ‘a constitution’, 
much higher expectations of the European citizens that this document would 
40 The Future Shape of Europe, Keynote Lecture by Senator Robert Badinter, The Law 
Society, March 10, 2003, available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/Media/Badinter.pdf. 
41 The Convention on the Future of Europe: proposals for a European Constitution, House 
of Commons, Research Paper 03/23, March 2003, p. 48. The British understanding of 
the nature of the new constitutive document of the EU is perhaps best elaborated in the 
draft constitution submitted to the Convention by its delegate Peter Haine. This “unof-
ﬁ cial” British proposal, made by the working group headed by Prof. Alan Dashwood in 
its ﬁ rst article deﬁ nes the nature of the EU: “The Union shall be established as a consti-
tutional order of sovereign states. The Member States have chosen in some measure to 
exercise their sovereignties in common, through the institutions of the Union, under the 
conditions laid down by this Treaty.” In the commentary of this article would be stated 
that this article clearly conveys the idea that by adhering to the Union, the Member 
States have not divested themselves of their sovereignty in whole or in part, they have 
chosen to “pool” aspects of their respective sovereignties by exercising those aspects in 
common, through the institutions of the Union. See Draft Constitutional Treaty of the 
European Union and related documents, CONV 345/01/02 REV 1, October 16, p. 13.
42 See Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Rüth, The European Convention and Its Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Appropriate Answers to the Laeken Questions?, 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 6, p. 1320.
43 See especially the pamphlet of British Eurosceptic David Heathcoat-Amory, The Euro-
pean Constitution and what it means for Britain, Centre for Policy Studies, London, 
2004.
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strengthen democracy, efﬁ ciency and responsibility of the European institu-
tions, were not fulﬁ lled.
It is fair to conclude that the constitutional terminology of the European 
Convention was therefore of no value to the EU Constitution. Just the opposite 
- this constitutional vocabulary would mobilize against the document all the 
opponents of European integration seeing in it the ﬁ rst symbolic step in the 
direction of the creation of some future European federal state. However, on 
the other hand, the Constitutional treaty did not get on the “constitutional 
legitimacy”, in particular because it did not look as a constitution (more on 
that in another section). What is more important, declaring ‘The Treaty on 
establishing the Constitution for Europe’ to be a ‘Constitution for Europe’ 
required in some countries, politically if not legally, a popular referendum. And 
that is exactly what has happened in France and the Netherlands.44 However, the 
European constitution- makers could not accept, when discussing the ratiﬁ ca-
tion procedure at the Convention, that the document they have been prepar-
ing requires direct popular acceptance. A large minority insisted on ratifying 
the Constitution “as usual”. Because of that the Convention did not specify a 
unique ratiﬁ cation procedure that would emphasize the role of the people at 
the level of the EU, and would be as much as possible advantageous from the 
standpoint of the probability of Constitution’s ratiﬁ cation. The question that 
has to be answered by the European constitution-makers is: What is the point 
of declaring a document to be “a constitution”, and not “a treaty”, and then 
proceed as usual - to ratify this “constitution” exactly in the same way as all 
the treaties were ratiﬁ ed before it. It is a mistake that the American founding 
fathers did not make - they knew that the document they had drafted could not 
be named ‘a constitution’ and then ratiﬁ ed according to the same procedure as 
the confederal treaty called the Articles of Confederation (but even they opted 
for representative conventions rather than a popular referendum).
I would recommend naming the document a “Basic Treaty” or “Basic Char-
ter” or “Basic Law” (it is still the ofﬁ cial title of the German Constitution). A 
44 Analysing why President Chirac decided to submit the European Constitution to a popu-
lar referendum, as that was not constitutionally prescribed, Joachim Schild ﬁ nds out that 
“the treaty reform and especially symbolically highly burdened labelling of the project 
as a ‘Constitution’ would have its costs in the internal policy, in case of not asking the 
sovereign”, especially after the announcement of the constitutional referendum in Great 
Britain. See Schild, Ein Sieg der Angst - das gescheiterte französische Verfassungsrefe-
rendum, Integration, 3/2005, p. 188.
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new name for the fundamental document of the EU would give an added value 
to the Convention’s document, but it would not require popular ratiﬁ cation.
PROPOSITION NO. 3: THE CONSTITUTION COMPLETELY 
UNINTELLIGIBLE TO A COMMON 
CITIZEN
At the end of his study of constitution-making Prof. Edward McWhinney 
gives “some rules of constitutional prudence for contemporary constitution-
-makers”. Among those 15 rules, I emphasize the ﬁ rst two: 
“Rule 1 Keep the constitutional charter short. A constitution is neither a 
municipal ordinance on sewers and drains, nor a master planner’s detailed 
blueprint for a new community welfare programme.
Rule 2 Keep the language of the charter clear and non-technical. The charter 
is intended to be read and understood by ordinary citizens, and not simply 
by constitutional specialists and Supreme Court judges.”45
It is doubtless that the European constitution-makers did not follow these 
rules, although the President of the European Convention Giscard d’Estaing 
insisted that “in style, the Constitution should not resemble a legal document 
or the kind of international treaty which attempts to anticipate any possible 
misinterpretation or trickery”. Instead, the Convention “must produce a clear, 
interesting and creative text”, because “the poetry of a constitution is in some 
ways the calligraphy of history”.46 At the end, the result of the European Con-
vention will not match Giscard’s demands. The European Constitution is a 
document of 448 articles, more than 60 accompanying protocols and declara-
tions, and more than 470 pages in the Ofﬁ cial Journal, which in many ways 
goes beyond the conventional images of the extent of a constitution. It is not 
surprising that an American Supreme Court judge would write that “the most 
striking characteristic of the proposed European Constitution is its length, 
about 75,000 words, compared with the American Constitution’s approximate 
45 Edward McWhinney, Constitution-making: Principles, process, practice, pp. 133-4.
46 Cit. according to Elisabeth Defeis, A Constitution for the European Union? A Transat-
lantic Perspective, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, Volo. 19, No. 2, 
2005, p. 382.
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7,500”.47 Therefore it is not strange that the European constitution referendum 
voting would be compared with the ﬁ ctive referendum on the reproductive 
cloning, where each citizen would receive the textbook on molecular biology 
of 500 pages.48 After the French referendum failure Prof. Jo Shaw said that 
“(p)erhaps the decision to submit to popular vote in nearly half the Member 
States a document such as the Constitutional Treaty will go down as one of the 
biggest political blunders committed by political leaders during the history of 
the EU”. It was clearly a “severe case of constitutional delusion”.49 
This political blunder is even greater, because numerous constitutional 
experts, some politicians, and several members of the European Convention 
have been proposing for years much better solutions for systematization of 
the existing EU treaties. Generally, they all proposed separation of the treaty 
texts in two parts. The ﬁ rst part would be the so-called basic treaty, a kind of 
constitutional nucleus, which would include the goals and principles of the 
Union, the institutional framework and the rights of the citizens. The second 
part would include all the other articles of the existing treaties, relating to 
the speciﬁ c policies of the European communities and the EU. Some of the 
variants also included different ways of ratiﬁ cation of these two parts: all the 
Member States would still ratify the basic treaty unanimously, but the second 
part would be ratiﬁ ed by some super-qualiﬁ ed majority in the Council, with 
the assent of the European Parliament.50 
 There is no question that the existing text of the Treaty establishing the 
Constitution of Europe, which has 448 articles, should have been separated 
in two parts. The ‘constitutional part’ would contain Part I (which is in the 
ﬁ nal draft without a name, but in the ﬁ rst draft of the Constitution this part 
was named as ‘the Constitutional structure’51), and Part II (which includes 
47 Stephen G. Breyer, Competing Models in the Proposed Constitution, p. 37. 
48 Paul Virilio, Das betäubte Volk, Die Zeit 25 May 2005.
49 Jo Shaw, After the referendums: Change or continuity in the legal and constitutional 
orders of the European Union?, EU Constitution Newsletter Special Issue July 2005, 
The Federal Trust, p. 7.
50 See e.g. the proposal of the “three wise men” in the Report to the European Commission 
on the institutional implications of enlargement (Richard Von Weizacker, Jean-Luc De-
haene and David Simon, The Institutional Implications of Enlargement: Report to the 
European Commision,, p. 12., available at (http://europa.eu.int/igc2000/repoct99_en.pdf.)
51 See the Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty, CONV 369/02, October 28, 2002, pp. 
2 and 8.
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the Charter of fundamental rights), with the articles of Part IV (ratiﬁ cation 
and amending the Constitution). In this variant, the ‘constitutional part’ of 
the Constitution would have altogether 126 articles, like an average national 
constitution. Remaining 322 articles from Part III (policies and functioning of 
the Union) would form a separate organic law, possibly with a different ratiﬁ -
cation procedure. It was exactly this part of the Constitution, as remarked by 
some pedantic French analysts, which contained numerous terms not usually 
found in a constitution.52 This third part of the Constitution provoked the 
largest debates and most misunderstandings in the public, especially in France, 
although it contained mostly articles from the existing EU treaties.
After the failure of the constitutional referendum in France, the President 
of the European Convention Valery Giscard d’Estaing would blame President 
Chirac for it. One of his accusations was that the citizens were confused, because 
they were asked to vote for the entire Constitution, including all earlier treaties 
in force for decades. The crucial turning point for the destiny of the Constitution 
in France, in his opinion, was Chirac’s decision to send to each French voter 
the complete Constitution, together with the third and longest part. D’Estaing 
tried to convince Chirac not to do that because “it is not possible for anyone 
to understand the whole text”, but he, allegedly, would not listen.53
PROPOSITION NO. 4: THE CONSTITUTION ‘WITHOUT VISION, 
WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM, WITHOUT 
SOUL, WITHOUT AMBITIONS’
Introducing his plan of the constitutional reform of the Confederation to 
George Washington on the eve of the Philadelphia Convention, James Madison 
wrote: “Temporising applications will dishonour the Councils which propose 
them, and may foment the internal malignity of the disease, at the same time 
they produce an ostensible palliation of it. Radical attempts although unsuccess-
52 B. Cassen would “discover” that the word ‘bank’ appears in the Constitution 176 times, 
‘market’ 88 times, ‘liberalization’ or ‘liberal’ 9 times, ‘competition’ or ‘competitive’ 29 
times, ‘capital’ 23 times etc. See B. Cassen, Laæna debata o Europskom ustavu (The False 
Debate on the European Constitution), LE MONDE diplomatique, February 2005, p. 4. 
53 European Charter Architect Faults Chirac for Its Rejection, The New York Times, June 
15, 2005.
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ful will at least justify the authors of them.”54 Washington’s opinion was the 
same: “My wish is that the Convention may adopt no temporizing expedient, 
but probe the defects of the Constitution to the bottom, and provide radical 
cures, whether they are agreed to or not”.55
Before the actual beginning of the constitution-making process, the author of 
the constitutional outline indicated the impropriety of short-term or palliative 
solutions. Madison’s plans of the radical reform of the Articles of Confederation 
have been accepted, in principle, almost by all delegates in Philadelphia. In the 
Convention the opinion has prevailed, stated by James Wilson, that regarding 
the power of it, the Convention is authorized to conclude nothing, but to be 
at liberty to propose anything.56 Having adopted such a view the Philadelphia 
Convention made a constitution that is even today regarded as a masterpiece 
of constitution-making. 
The Brussels Convention did not avail itself of a possible potential of a 
constitutional assembly, opting for “further gradual development instead of a 
‘constitutional revolution’”.57 It is indisputable that the Draft Constitution of 
the European Convention is far behind the level of the Philadelphian Constitu-
tion. And it would not be correct to compare these two constitutional documents 
if it has not been done by the European constitution-makers themselves. 
The former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi in his ﬁ rst 
comment (usually the most honest) has said that the European Constitution 
“lacks the vision and ambition”.58 A French scholar would state similarly that 
the European constitution is a “project without vision, without enthusiasm, 
without soul, without ambitions”.59
54 The letter to Washington, April 16 1787, in Marvin Meyers ed., The Mind of the 
Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison, University Press of New 
England, Hanover, 1981, p. 66.
55 Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention, W.W.Norton & Co., New York, p.120.
56 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1966, 1;253.
57 Juliane Kokott, Alexandra Rüth, The European Convention and Its Draft Treaty Estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe, p. 1318.
58 Tidying up or tyranny, The Economist, May 29, 2003.
59 A. Mattera, Éditorial - Les zones d’ombre du projet de Constitution dans l’architecture 
institutionnelle de l’Union : la composition de la Commission. La Convention touche au 
coeur du projet européen, Revue du droit de l’Union, 2003, No. 1, pp. 5-12.
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There were in the document indeed too few of those solutions that could 
be considered long-lasting, and visionary. It has been correctly predicted by 
some analysts that it is wrong to disturb one pragmatic arrangement, which has 
evolved in Europe in past few decades, with “an idealistic scheme for greater 
democratic deliberation and high-proﬁ le constitutional revision, which was 
then oversold to the European public”.60
The fact is that the European constitution-makers did not follow Madison’s 
thinking, and so they gave up all more radical solutions, even when the majo-
rity in the Convention preferred these solutions, because of the fear that the 
Intergovernmental Conference would not accept these propositions. Here are 
only a few examples. Just at the beginning of its work, the Brussels Convention 
had not clearly declared that it was going to make a constitution. Instead, it 
allowed that the product of its deliberations could be perceived by some as a 
constitution, by others as a treaty, or as a mixture of these two concepts, namely 
a constitutional treaty. In lieu of making a constitution understandable to a 
plain citizen, the Convention had made a document that was completely unin-
telligible. Instead of elaborating a new concept of representative democracy on 
the European level, taking into account different models of parliamentary and 
presidential government, the Convention satisﬁ ed itself with little shifts in the 
framework of the existing semi-parliamentary system.61 The greatest novelty 
in the institutional framework, arising out of the Convention’s proceedings, is 
the President (or Chairman) of the European Council, a sort of the President 
of the Union. But, instead of thinking how to elect this president by the people 
or indirectly by some kind of an electoral college composed of the members of 
European and national parliaments (as has been suggested by some delegates), 
or in some other way compatible with the modern principles of representative 
60 Andrew Moravcsik, Europe works well without the grand illusions, Financial Times, 
June 14, 2005.
61 Anne Peters was ﬁ rst to bring the notion of the ‘semi-parliamentary’ system to the EU. 
Evaluating the achievements of the draft Constitution especially regarding the creation, 
composition and powers of the European parliament she would say that “a crucial point 
seems to be that there are no genuinely European elections on European issues, fought 
at a European level, to install and remove European governments solely on the basis of 
political disagreement. This means that effective popular control of European govern-
ment (constisting of the Commission and the Council) via parliamentary election or 
referendums does not exist” (footnotes omitted). See A. Peters, European Democracy 
after the 2003 Convention, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2004, p. 68. 
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government, the Convention satisﬁ ed itself with the election of this president 
by the chiefs of states and governments inside the European Council.
Whence the American constitution-makers have given to their president 
democratic legitimacy (at ﬁ rst indirectly by the election of electors by the 
state legislatures, but very soon by electing the President de facto by the people 
themselves), and have created an institution which would symbolize the unity 
of new nation, the European constitution-makers have given to their president 
no democratic legitimacy at all.62 
Instead of writing a constitutional preamble that could indisputably point 
to the double foundation of the EU, as a community of peoples and states of 
Europe, from the existing text it is hard to understand who actually the con-
stitution-making subject is.
The American Constitution, as it is often stated, have endeavoured to install 
a lasting institutional order, which could withstand the challenges of the future, 
and which could forever decide the prospect of republican (democratic) govern-
ment in the world. The European Constitution, as recently stated by George 
Bermann, “is written with the unspoken understanding that the institutions 
it is setting up are transitory, that they are far from optimal, and that it would 
be desirable to change them right now if political realities allowed it.”63
The paradox of the European constitution-making lays in the fact that the 
revolutionary method of constitution-making by a constitutional convention 
has, contrary to all expectations, produced a “simple reform”64, or “a pragmatic 
reform of existing institution”.65
Such a “pragmatic reform” could not provoke awaking of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ of the EU citizens. Just the opposite, in all those states where it has 
62 As propounded by Kokott and Rüth, “President of the European Council … will not be 
accountable to any Parliament and whose democratic legitimacy is, therefore, more than 
doubtful”. Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Rüth, The European Convention and Its Draft 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, p. 1337.
63 George A. Bermann, Europe’s Never-Ending Constitution, available at http://www.proj-
ect-syndicate.org/commentaries. 
64 Oliver Beaud, Der Entwurf einer Verfassung für Europa - verfassungsrechtliche Betrach-
tungen aus französicher Perspective, Forum Constitutionis Europae, Walter Hallstein 
Institut, FCE 6/03, December 2003, p. 1 
65 J. Schwarze, Ein pragmatischer Verfassungsentwurf. Analyse und Bewertung des vom 
Europäischen Verfassungskonvent vorgelegten Entwurfes eines Vertrag über eine Verfas-
sung für Europa. Europarecht, Jul-August 2003, pp. 535-73.
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been prescribed by the Constitution or by the law that the Constitution has 
to be approved in a referendum, we have witnessed exceptional uncertainties 
about the prospect that the citizens would not even care to vote, not to speak 
of voting for the Constitution. 
The surveys of public opinion in France, conducted during March 2005, 
almost shocked the French political elite showing that the majority of citizens 
would not vote for the proposed Constitution, and what was even more dis-
turbing, that the majority thought the rejection of the Constitution would not 
represent a serious stroke for the European construction.66 Of course, such a 
constitution could not pretend to bring closer the European peoples to the at-
tainment of a “European dream”, notwithstanding some statements that the 
constitutional solutions are heading in this direction.67 The European Con-
stitution would forever stay, as baptized by Andrew Moravcsik, “the unsung 
constitution”.68 
PROPOSITION NO. 5: THE ASSENT OF THE PEOPLE IS NOT 
NECESSARY TO THE FORMATION OF A 
CONFEDERATION 
The next proposition I would like to elaborate is that in the normative sense 
there is no reason and need for the people to be directly engaged in the crea-
tion of a confederal union or in the amending of its fundamental documents.69 
This thesis was actually stated for the ﬁ rst time by the American antifederalists 
during the great ratiﬁ cation debate on the proposed Philadelphia Constitution. 
Criticizing the proposed ratiﬁ cation of the Constitution by the people’s con-
ventions the leader of the antifederalist opposition in the Virginia’s ratiﬁ cation 
convention Patrick Henry explained why popular ratiﬁ cation is not needed:
66 French ‘non’ in the lead ahead of the Constitution referendum, EU Observer, 29 
March2005.
67 See e.g. Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Rüth, The European Convention and Its Draft 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, pp. 1315-45.
68 Moravcsik, The unsung constitution, Prospect, March 2004, p. 80.
69 For a contrary argument advocating a mandatory referendum for any new contract and 
quasi-constitutional steps in the EU requiring the consent of majorities in all Member 
States for its ratiﬁ cation see Heidrun Abromeit, Democracy in Europe: Legitimising 
Politics in a Non-State Polity, Berghahn Books, New York, 1998.
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“The assent of the people in their collective capacity is not necessary to 
the formation of a federal Government. The people have no right to enter 
into leagues, alliances, or confederations: They are not the proper agents 
for this purpose: States and sovereign powers are the only proper agents 
for this kind of Government. Show me an instance where the people have 
exercised this business: Has it not always gone through the Legislatures? I 
refer you to the treaties with France, Holland, and other nations: How were 
they made? Were they not made by the States? Are the people therefore in 
the aggregate capacity, the proper persons to form a Confederacy?”70
In the terminology of the 18th century American constitutional polemic 
the terms ‘federal government’ and ‘confederation’ had the same meaning, so 
Henry was using them as synonyms. The Articles of Confederation were rati-
ﬁ ed by the state legislatures, and therefore Henry was right.
However, the constitution-makers had accepted Madison’s view that the 
Articles were defective exactly because the federal treaty, inasmuch as it was 
accepted by the state legislatures, did not have legally higher status than any 
other state law. The Articles of Confederation, as a mere treaty “between 
governments of independent states”, were continuously violated, and that 
opened up the possibility of its termination. Madison was convinced that “in 
the case of a union of people under one Constitution” this possibility was out 
of question and because of this he thought that it was necessary to base the 
new Constitution on the acceptance by the people. In the Convention Madison 
said that the crucial difference between a league and a treaty, in relation to a 
constitution, was in the fact that the former was based only on the legislatures, 
and the latter on the people: a league is a treaty between state governments, 
and a constitution is ‘a union of people’. Beside this, as the new Constitution 
“would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions”, Madison consi-
dered that “it is indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratiﬁ ed in 
the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people 
themselves”, because the people were “the fountain of all power, and by re-
sorting to them, all difﬁ culties were got over. They could alter constitutions as 
they pleased”.71 The new system, based on the approval of the people would 
70 The Antifederalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution, ed. by Murray Dry, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985, p. 304.
71 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, 1;122-3, 2;92-3, 476.
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therefore eliminate all possible controversies and doubts about the legitimacy 
of the proposed Constitution. However, it should also be stressed that there 
were signiﬁ cant ‘tactical’ reasons to avoid the ratiﬁ cation by the state legisla-
tures, because the constitution-makers considered them to be ‘losers of power’ 
in the new system.
In the nationalist interpretation of the creation of the American Constitu-
tion its acceptance by the people’s conventions will always be seen as a crucial 
feature which separates the new federal system (later called federation), resting 
on the acceptance of a single American people, from the earlier Confederation, 
resting on the treaty between state legislatures.72 The states’ rights interpreta-
tion, on the other hand, would emphasize the constitutional ratiﬁ cation by the 
consent of state peoples, as sovereign political communities. 
However, the question is: Could these experiences of the American constitu-
tion-making be applicable in the making of the European Constitution? First, I 
would like to stress that I see the European Union, taking into consideration all 
of its unique features, as a union of states, with predominantly characteristics 
of that species of the federal system usually called a confederation, and such 
a deﬁ nition of the EU is accepted by a majority of scholars.73
72 As one of the supporters of this thesis Herbert Storing claims: “The provision for ratifying 
the Constitution rested, in the main, on the…assumption that the American states are 
not several political wholes, associated together according to their several wills and for the 
sake of their several interests, but are, and always were from the moment of their separa-
tion from the King of England, parts of one whole. Thus constitutional change is the busi-
ness of the people, not of the state legislatures, though the people act in (or through) their 
states. As one nation divided into several states, moreover, constitutional change is to be 
decided, not by unanimous consent of separate and equal entities, but by the major part 
of a single whole - an extraordinary majority because of the importance of the question”. 
See Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For: The Political Thought of the Opponents 
of the Constitution, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, p. 13.
73 I would point out the representative sample of scholars treating the EU as some sort of 
a confederation. For Elazar the EU looks ever more as “the model post-modern confed-
eration” (Elazar, The New Europe: a Federal State or a Confederation of States?, Swiss 
Political Science Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1998, pp. 119-138). Alexander Warlaigh calls 
EU “the structural confederation” (Warlaigh, Better the Devil You Know? Synthetic 
and Confederal Understandings of European Uniﬁ cation, West European Politics, Vol. 
21, No. 3, 1998, pp. 1-18). John Kincaid claims that EU works as “confederal federal-
ism, namely, as a confederal order of government that operates in a signiﬁ cantly federal 
mode within its spheres of competence” (Kincaid, Confederal Federalism and Citizen 
Representation in the European Union, West European Politics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1999, 
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If the American constitution-makers were troubled by the fact that the Ar-
ticles of Confederation did not have legally higher status than ordinary state 
laws, and because of continuing breaches of the confederal treaty by several 
states, the European constitution-makers have not been faced with this kind 
of problems. What is always fascinating for analysts of European integration 
is an extraordinary constitutional discipline characterizing the Member States 
of the EU, in comparison with other examples of federal unions.74
As a motive of popular adoption of the constitution remains the wish to 
make the European integration project more legitimate, i.e. that the EU in 
this way outgrows the frames of a confederation, or a mere treaty between the 
states, exactly as it was proposed by Madison in Philadelphia in the case of 
the United States.75
pp. 34-58). For Andrew Moravcsik the EU seems to be “more confederal than federal” 
(Moravcsik, Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality, in Howse and 
Nicolaidis, The Federal Vision, OUP, Oxford 2001, p. 176). Joseph Weiler thinks that 
the EU is “a combination of ‘confederal institutional order and ‘federal’ legal order” 
(Weiler, Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg, ibid., p. 58). The 
most profound theoretician of confederalism today Murray Forsyth thinks that the EU 
is best understood as an “economic confederation” (Forsyth, Unions of States, Leicester 
University Press, Leicester, 1981, p. 183). Michael Burgess concluded that “the most 
accurate description of the contemporary EU remains that of a confederation but it is 
certainly more than a mere ‘economic confederation’’” (Burgess, Federalism and Euro-
pean Union: The Building of Europe, 1950-2000, Rutledge, London, 2000, p. 265).
  And the notion of ‘Staatenverbund’, used by the German Constitutional Court in its fa-
mous opinion on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht, which is also almost 
impossible to translate, shows that the EU is essentially a ‘union of states’ (Staatenbund), 
and not a ‘federal state’ (Bundesstaat). On various understandings of the essence of the 
term Staatenverbund see in Manfred H. Wiegandt, German International Integration: 
The Rulings of the German Constitutional Court on the Maastricht Treaty and the Out-
of-Area Deployment of German Troops, American University Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 10, 1994-1995, p. 895.
74 Especially interesting is the study of Leslie Friedman Goldstein about the processes of 
federalization, i.e. of the reasons why the sovereign Member States of the EU have, as a 
rule, more easily accepted the verdicts of the European Court of Justice than the Ameri-
can states accepted the decisions of the Supreme Court in the ﬁ rst 70 years after the 
ratiﬁ cation of the Constitution. See L. Friedman Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sov-
ereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, 2001.
75 The former judge of the German Constitutional Court Dieter Grimm has brought the 
thesis that the European Constitution was not important because of its legal function, 
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“Europe’s constitutional architecture has never been validated by a process 
of constitutional adoption by a European constitutional demos”76 - this remark 
of Joseph Weiler seems to me to be the basic reason and motive of initiating 
the European constitution-making process. Such a ‘constitutional demos’, in 
his opinion, exists in contemporary federations (American, Australian, German, 
and Canadian), although at the time of the creation of these federal unions, and 
nations as well, such a ‘constitutional demos’ perhaps did not exist, because the 
legal presupposition of the existence of a constitutional demos does not have 
to be conﬁ rmed in the political and social reality. The example of the United 
States in the decades before the Civil War, or the contemporary examples of 
Canada or Spain, as pointed out by Weiler, show that the legal presupposi-
tion of a unitary nation is contradicted by the social reality of multiple ethnic 
groups or nations, which do not share a feeling of commonness, and which do 
not constitute a political community essential to a constitutional compact. In 
Weiler’s thinking the creation of a constitution has to be connected with the 
existence of a constitutional demos, i.e. with the presence of a single pouvoir 
constituent, consisting of the citizens of the federation in whose sovereignty a 
speciﬁ c constitutional arrangement is rooted.
When the European Constitution would be formally ratiﬁ ed by a ‘European 
constituent power’, which assumes any kind of all-European constitutional 
plebiscite, this act would be, in Weiler’s view, of huge legal and political im-
portance and transformative to the present European constitutionalism. In 
case of such an all-European constitutional referendum, according to Weiler, 
the EU would become “a federal state in all but name”.77 On the other hand, 
the approval of the Constitution by the peoples of Europe “in their status as 
national communities, will afﬁ rm the constitutional status quo, independently 
of the content of the document”78, i.e. as he will explain in another place, “if a 
‘constitution’ be anything other than a European constituent power, it will be 
but because of its “anticipated collective and emotive beneﬁ ts and thus its integrative 
value”, as other possible integrative factors (like nationality, language, religion, history, 
culture or common enemy) do not exist. See Grimm, Integration by constitution, Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 3, No. 2/3, 2005, pp. 193-208.
76 Weiler, In defence of the status quo: Europe’s constitutional Sonderweg, in J.H.H.Weiler 
and Marlene Wind ed., European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 2003, p. 9.
77 Ibid, p. 7-9.
78 Weiler, A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, p. 566.
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a treaty masquerading as a constitution”.79 This means that even in the case of 
constitutional referendums in all of the Member States, but based on each state’s 
separate decision to hold the referendum, and taking into consideration each 
state’s decision separately, it would be still an intergovernmental treaty.80
The fact is that today in Europe there does not exist such a ‘constitutional 
demos’ needed for the creation of a federal state - European integration as-
sumes at all times a constitution without the traditional political community 
which would be deﬁ ned and proposed by that constitution. As remarked by the 
French philosopher Etienne Balibar, the European Constitution “presumes to be 
resolved what is in fact in question: the nature and existence of the constituent 
power on the European level”.81 
In the United States during the confederation period there existed a sig-
niﬁ cant part of the political elite (the Federalists), assuming that there already 
existed a single American nation created in the War of Independence, and 
because of that there existed the basic presumption to entrust the American 
people the role of a pouvoir constituent. However, the other part of the same 
elite (‘the Antifederalists’) thought that it was more correct to assume the 
existence of 13 different nations. In today’s Europe, there is no dilemma on 
the same issue - there are no ‘Federalists’ as the politically relevant part of the 
elite in several Member States that would base the European Constitution on 
a European constitutive power. Just the opposite, the dominant attitude, elabo-
rated as early as 1993 by the German Constitutional Court in its Maastricht 
opinion, is that a union of democratic states and peoples, as is the EU, ﬁ nds 
its democratic legitimacy in acts of the national parliaments, as representatives 
of each single people.82
79 Weiler, In defence of the status quo, p. 7. In the latest work, Weiler would modify this 
judgement: “But what international treaty in Europe can claim to have been ratiﬁ ed by 
popular referendum in more than half the member states? One need not be a card-carrying 
legal realist to understand the impact that this outcome will have on the ensuing constitu-
tional conversation, including constitutional adjudication. The process will have become a 
constitutional process of ratiﬁ cation, and the peoples of Europe will have spoken, at least 
in some sense, as a pouvoir constitutant.” See Weiler, On the Power of the Word, p. 181
80 This opinion was shared by all American states’ rights theoreticians in their interpreta-
tion of the ratiﬁ cation process of the American Constitution.
81 Euro-elites desperately seeking demos, Spiked-politics 21 February 2005.
82 See the decision of the German Constitutional Court BVerfGE 89, 155 (184) - Maas-
tricht.
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The debate about legitimating the European process of integration has been 
characterized for years by the assumption that it is possible to transfer on the 
European level, and accommodate to it the constitutional principles associated 
with the state level. The non-existence of afﬁ nity or mutual understanding 
between the EU institutions and the citizens is always emphasized, but as 
asked by Antje Wiener, “why should it matter at all, if the Euro-polity is not 
expected to turn into anything akin to a nation state?”83 
 If, then, there are today no indications of a possible European constitutive 
power, the whole project of formalization and rationalization of the contem-
porary European confederation in one document should have been divested of 
any constitutional rhetoric and the need to legitimate that document directly 
by the people. 
The most important question, in my opinion, is whether some kind of 
international democracy is possible and whether there is a possibility to demo-
cratically legitimate the EU in the same way as the national states. Robert Dahl 
has recently stated this question, and he does not ﬁ nd real the possibility that 
international systems develop basic political institutions of modern repre-
sentative democracy.84 Even in the EU, which has gone further than any other 
international organization in the development of democratic institutions, and 
is actually the only supranational polity debating about ‘democratic deﬁ cit’, 
there are exceptional obstacles in developing of a democratic framework.85 
Even if the European constitution-makers could agree on some basic demo-
cratic principles common to the constitutions of several Member States, as 
83 Antje Wiener, Finality vs. Enlargement: constitutive practices and opposing rationales in 
the reconstruction of Europe, in J.H.H.Weiler and Marlene Wind ed., European Consti-
tutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, p. 188.
84 Robert A. Dahl, Is international democracy possible? A critical view, in Sergio Fabbrini 
ed., Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the United States, Ruth-
ledge, London, 2005, pp.194-204.
85 On this Eric Stein says: “Today in Europe, modern democracy appears in a great variety 
of systems in which the voice of an individual citizen is heard in varying ways and de-
grees. It ranges from the ‘omnipotent Parliament in Westminster to the republican-presi-
dential system in France, the consensual pattern in Switzerland, the strong regionalism 
in Spain, and the federal variants in Germany, Austria and Belgium…It is not surprising 
that the builders of the new Community would look to their own systems for a speciﬁ ca-
tion of the general principle (of democracy).” Stein, International Integration and De-
mocracy: No Love at First Sight, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, 2001, 
p. 524.
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e.g. people as a fountain of all power, majority government, responsibility of 
all public institutions, separation of powers, independent judiciary, it is the 
question how these general principles would be operationalized in a suprana-
tional system, in the sense of constitutional choices between the presidential 
or parliamentary (or semi-presidential) system, different models of separation 
of powers, models of judicial review, electoral systems etc.
Furthermore, there is exceptional diversity of citizens inside this interna-
tional system - in their historical experiences, identities, cultures, values, loyal-
ties, and languages. This opens the question of the creation of political culture 
that would induce citizens to support their political institutions during the 
conﬂ icts and crises. In the end, as propounded by Dahl, “the nature of many 
international decisions makes it extremely difﬁ cult and even impossible for 
most citizens to provide their informed consent to the decision”.86 Citing the 
example of the USA, Dahl says that even federalism cannot survive the deep 
economic, social, cultural, and geographic cleavages, as existed between North 
and South in the ﬁ rst half of the 19th century. Although it is difﬁ cult for me 
to accept Dahl’s claim that the inhabitants of the US already by 1790 in a 
great majority considered themselves to be Americans, and had the feeling of 
common nationality very soon after the creation of the Union.87 When, then, 
it is impossible to imagine democratic institutions, as existing on the level of 
nation-states on the level of international organizations too, it is impossible 
to think of the EU as a new federation in creation, not even as a federation 
of nation-states.
In that sense the referendums on European treaties or on the proposed Con-
stitutional treaty are completely unnecessary and inappropriate in a confederal 
system such as the EU is, and would remain even after the possible acceptance 
of the Constitution.
International treaties, concluded every few years between the Member States 
(from the Single European Act of 1986 to the Treaty of Nice of 2001 there have 
been four such treaties) are the result of complicated intergovernmental agree-
ments, often after awkward negotiations, and compromises which are usually the 
result of such negotiations are difﬁ cult to explain to the wider public in several 
states. Nevertheless, the chiefs of states and governments who have reached 
the deal inside the European Council could guarantee that this agreement will 
86 Robert A. Dahl, Is international democracy possible? p. 200.
87 Ibid., p. 202.
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be ratiﬁ ed by the parliament in each state, because governments can usually 
count on the majority support in the legislature. Moreover, the European treaties 
have been often ratiﬁ ed in parliaments by the consensus of the most important 
majority and opposition parties. On the other hand, plebiscitary voting of the 
citizens has proven to be very perilous, and it is hardly to be expected that any 
new treaty will be simply and quickly accepted if its ratiﬁ cation depends on 
the direct voting of the citizens. Besides that, it is difﬁ cult to decide in a refer-
endum simply with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ when you are often confronted with complex 
compromises, resulting from intergovernmental bargaining.
The Union should develop its own version of democracy, compatible with 
the confederal nature of the system. The example given by Stein is a possibility 
of giving a greater role to the national parliaments in the control of the Euro-
pean institutions, and especially of EU legislation.88 Laeken Declaration would 
also specify a potential role of the national parliaments in the enforcement of 
the principle of subsidiarity. The Brussels Convention has spent a lot of time 
debating this issue, and its solutions on the role of national parliaments in the 
new institutional architecture of the EU, although perhaps not the best could 
be considered positive.89
PROPOSITION NO. 6: THE VOTING OF THE PEOPLE BETTER 
FITTED TO PULL DOWN THAN TO BUILD 
UP CONSTITUTIONS 
Oliver Ellsworth, one of the members of the Connecticut delegation in the 
Philadelphia Convention, would argue, in one of debates on the ratiﬁ cation 
article of the Constitution that he did not like “these conventions”, because 
“they were better ﬁ tted to pull down than to build up Constitutions”. His 
colleague from Massachusetts Elbridge Gerry would similarly anticipate that 
“great confusion…would result from a recurrence to the people. They would 
never agree on any thing”.90 
Both of them, as their like-minded colleagues in Philadelphia, had in view 
the experience of the state of Massachusetts, where the people barely in the 
88 Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, American Jour-
nal of International Law, Vol. 95, 2001, p. 524.
89 See Robert Podolnjak, Dvije ustavne konvencije, pp. 1169-72.
90 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, 1;335, 2;90.
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third try had approved the Constitution, as the ﬁ rst in an American state. How 
great has been the scepticism of the American constitution-makers about the 
people’s involvement in deciding on the Constitution shows the fact in the last 
decision-making on the issue: there were as much as four (of ten) delegations 
at the time in Philadelphia against the ratiﬁ cation of the Constitution by the 
conventions.91
The argument that the voting of people is more suitable for pulling down 
than to build up Constitutions is similar to the former - that the people should 
have nothing with confederations. However, the former argument starts from 
the normative proposition that the people should not ratify confederal treaties, 
and the latter wants to point out that there could be signiﬁ cant problems with 
the constitutional acceptance, especially in federal unions, when that constitu-
tion has to be ratiﬁ ed by some sort of direct involvement of citizens (people’s 
conventions or referendum).
I would like to recall that the American federal Constitution has not been 
accepted by referendum in several states, as it is the usual method today when 
a constitution is submitted to the people for acceptance in numerous coun-
tries, but by the people’s conventions. In these conventions the delegates of 
particular districts have not often authentically represented the views of their 
constituencies, nor have electoral districts had the same number of electors (it 
is a well-known fact that the ‘Federalist districts, mostly at the coast, and the 
commercial areas of the USA, have been over-represented in some state con-
ventions). Certain historical researches of the voters divisions pro et contra the 
Constitution indicate that the opponents of the Constitution might have had 
a minimal majority across America, that in four states they had a signiﬁ cant 
majority, and in another two a minimal majority.92 This actually means that 
the American Constitution, which needed for ratiﬁ cation the acceptance of at 
91 Ibid., 2;476.
92 See Jackson Turner Main, The Anti-federalists: Critics of the Constitution 1781-1788, 
W.W.Norton & Co., New York, 1974, p. 249. Although they dispute these data about 
the Antifederalist majority in some states Riker and Fink state that the Antifederalists 
had a majority of delegates in ﬁ ve or six state conventions (respectively the people as 
in the case of Rhode Island). This would be enough to preclude the acceptance of the 
Constitution, but for the fact that a certain number of delegates had not changed sides 
during the convention proceedings. See Evelyn Fink and William Riker, The Strategy of 
Ratiﬁ cation, in Grofman and Wittman ed., The Federalist Papers and the New Institu-
tionalism, Agathon Press, New York, 1987, p. 227. 
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least 9 of 13 states, maybe would never have been ratiﬁ ed had the decision-
-making been by the direct voting of the people (as had been the case with the 
Constitution of Massachusetts), and not by the indirect voting in the people’s 
conventions.
It is often forgotten that, taking into account all the gloriﬁ cation of the 
principle of popular sovereignty in America, after the problematic and hazard-
ous experience with the adoption of the Constitution of Massachusetts and the 
federal Constitution, the praxis of constitutional conventions in the USA and 
in several states was very rare in the next half a century of the American con-
stitutional history. Until 1812, there was no state outside New England willing 
to submit its draft constitution to popular approval. By the end of the 1830’s 
34 state constitutions had been adopted, but only six by popular approval.93 
Moreover, it was not conforming to the principle of popular sovereignty that the 
amendments to the federal Constitution were, as a rule, adopted by the state 
legislatures (all except one).94 We could ask ourselves: if the state legislatures 
usually decided on the amendments to the US Constitution, why it would be 
undemocratic to let the parliaments of the Member States decide on the EU 
treaties, or even EU ‘Constitution’?
Numerous politicians in the EU are sceptical about the European referen-
dums, because, as they say, the ‘European issues’ are ‘too complex’. “When 
we ask voters a European question, the answer is either no, or yes by only the 
narrowest of margins. That should be telling us something”. Those are the 
words of an ofﬁ cial of the European Commission after the lost referendum in 
Sweden over the Euro.95 An unknown German ofﬁ cial once said that German 
citizens because of the higher price of bananas would probably have rejected 
the Rome treaties of 1957, starting the process of European integration.96 This 
is not surprising taking into consideration how little citizens know of the EU. 
A research of the British Foreign ofﬁ ce conducted in 2001 discovered that a 
93 See Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Indepen-
dence, Basic Books, New York, 1987, pp. 86-7, 236.
94 The only amendment submitted to the popular conventions was the XXIst, ratiﬁ ed in 
1933, which nulliﬁ ed the XVIII Amendment ratiﬁ ed in 1919, forbidding the production 
and sale of alcohol in the USA. 
95 Voters can be such a nuisance, Economist, 18 Sept 2003. The French politicians have 
forgotten that the French electorate barely ratiﬁ ed the Maastricht treaty (with only 51% 
of ‘yes’ votes).
96 Europe should vote, The Economist, 25 Sept 2003.
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quarter of the British do not know that their country is a member of the EU, 
and 7% have thought that the US is one of the Member States. In Germany, 
one survey has showed that 31% of examinees have never heard of the Euro-
pean Commission.97 
European politicians wanted by a constitutional convention and with public 
debate on the Draft Constitution to contribute to familiarising of the European 
citizens with the process and the goals of European integration. However, it 
has been shown in the end that this ‘great democratic experiment’ was useless, 
because the abstract constitutional polemics and the referendum campaign 
have given the perfect forum to different groups of anti-globalists, anti-immi-
gration parties, and to all kinds of anti-establishment grumblers. In the case 
of the European Constitution, the referendum has proved to be “a potentially 
dangerous instrument of direct democracy”.98
The German Professor Jürgen Schwarze was, to my knowledge, one of rare 
commentators of the European Constitution arguing against the idea of its 
ratiﬁ cation by the referendum at the time of the making of the Draft Constitu-
tion by the Convention on the Future of Europe. He as early as in 2003 wrote 
that the Draft was a “too complex document”, and therefore unsuitable for 
referendum voting. In his opinion, the European Constitution would “achieve 
its legitimacy better by its convincing content and by its continuous acceptance 
in practical politics and by the people”. Schultze declared himself against the 
possible amendments of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which would al-
low carrying out the referendum on the EU Constitution in Germany, thinking 
instead that the existing ratiﬁ cation procedure (two-thirds majority in both 
houses of the Parliament) was “sufﬁ cient to meet the demands of democratic 
legitimation”. He would prophetically conclude: “In view of the destiny of all 
visionary but failed constitutional drafts in the past I come to the conclusion 
the concept of pragmatism offers the best chances for realization, even in situ-
ations when there is a need for fundamental reforms such as the present”.99 
Should we, then, in the adoption of treaties or, for that matter the Draft 
Constitution, consider the possibility of popular referendums? A serious inves-
tigation carried out before the starting of the ratiﬁ cation process, shows that 
97 The great debate, The Economist, 12 June 2003.
98 Larry Siedentop, A crisis of legitimacy, Prospect, No. 112, July 2005.
99 Schultze, Guest editorial: The Convention’s draft treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 40, 2003, p. 1044.
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the referendum option has some signiﬁ cant shortcomings, and that popular 
involvement in the adoption of the Constitution does not have to mean that 
the problem of the ‘democratic deﬁ cit’ would be solved.100
National referendums on the EU issues belong, in principle, to the category 
of the so-called ‘sovereignty referendums’ (Souveränitätsreferenden), a sub-species 
of the constitutional referendums. Those referendums are not rarity - after 40 
EU referendums in 22 states until November 2004 they have become “the solid 
part of the European integration instruments”. Among them, there have been 9 
negative, and 31 positive referendums. These referendums could be separated 
in two groups. The ﬁ rst group consists of referendums in which citizens decide 
on accession to the speciﬁ c form of European integration (the European Com-
munity, the EU, or the ‘Euro-zone’). Those referendums, starting in the 1970’s, 
have become today, despite different constitutional obstacles and traditions, 
almost inevitable in the process of accession of candidate states to the EU. The 
reason for this is a conviction that it is democratically doubtful to transfer cer-
tain sovereign powers to another level without asking the sovereign. The second 
group of national referendums includes popular voting on the continuation, or 
intensiﬁ cation of European integrative efforts, in the form of new treaties and 
amendments thereof.101 There were altogether nine such ‘integrative referen-
100 See Auer, Referenden und europäische Öffenlichkeit - Nationale Volksabstimmungen 
über die Verfassung für Europa: Erfahrungen, Rechtgrundlagen, Perspektiven, Zeitschrift 
für Staats- und Europawissenschaften, 4/2004, pp. 580-596.
101 In the perspective, Auer thinks possible a third species of national EU referendums, 
which would be related to the deciding on the accession to the EU of new countries (e.g. 
Turkey). Similarly, another scholar would divide European referendums in two groups. 
In the ﬁ rst group are referendums whose “focus was essentially on whether to ‘belong’ to 
the Union”. The second kind of referendums is those related to a “process of becoming”, 
with focus on the speciﬁ c goal of further integration. The last such a referendum, before 
the referendums on the European Constitution, was the Swedish referendum in 2003 
on the Euro. His conclusion is that referendums on ‘belonging’ are not problematic, 
because in no state (or a candidate state) there is not evident such a critical mood to 
opt for seceding from, or refusing to accede to the EU. However, referendums on further 
integration are evermore hazardous, as evident from the experiences with the treaties of 
Maastricht, or Nice, with the Euro or the European Constitution. Therefore, in the EU 
there is not inherent ‘Euroscepticism’ in the sense of opposing the membership in the 
Union, but a kind of ‘federal scepticism’, in the sense of further integration leading to 
a possible federal Europe. See Lee Miles, Editorial: The Paradox of a Popular Europe, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, Annual Review, pp. 1-8.
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dums’, starting with the referendums in Denmark and Ireland on the Single 
European Act 1986/7. The referendums on the EU Constitution belong to this 
category. It is this category of national EU referendums that is ‘problematic’. 
That is because these referendums are implemented according to the national 
law, but they signiﬁ cantly affect the success of the supranational enterprise. It 
means that the citizens of each country decide not only on their approval of a 
particular project, but also on the destiny of that project, despite the opinion 
of the citizens in all the other Member States. Taking into consideration that 
the EU treaties could be changed only unanimously, the possibility that citizens 
in only one country stop a particular integrative project is real.
Because of Article 447, which prescribes that the Constitution has to be 
ratiﬁ ed unanimously, in accordance with the respective constitutional require-
ments of the Member States, each state has a veto on the Constitution. It 
might happen that a few thousand voters in one state prevent the ratiﬁ cation 
of the Constitution, despite the wishes of hundreds of millions of citizens in 
other Member States. And here is the American and Swiss experience with 
constitution-making most valuable.
The fact is that, as to the comparative experiences connected with the 
adoption of the federal constitution by the people (directly by referendum or 
indirectly through conventions) as possible exemplars or models for the adop-
tion of the EU Constitution, there are only the experiences of adoption of the 
American Constitution 1787/88 and the Swiss Constitution in 1848. In the 
American case the constitution-makers have avoided the ‘unanimity trap’ (as 
enacted in the Articles of Confederation) by prescribing that the Constitution 
would come into force when ratiﬁ ed by at least nine states, and be valid only 
for the ratifying states. So, the American solution had escaped the possibility 
of veto of one or a few states, leaving at the same time to each state to choose 
freely whether it would become a member of the new federal system. 
The solution of Swiss constitution-makers was different. After the short 
civil war a committee of the confederal assembly (Diet), composed of one 
member from each canton, worked out a draft of the federal constitution and 
submitted it to the people of each canton for approval. The Constitution was 
accepted in referendums in 15 and 1/
2
 of cantons, and rejected in six and 1/
2
 
cantons. After receiving the results from the cantons, the Diet decided that 
the vast majority of the people had accepted the Constitution, and declared 
it to be ratiﬁ ed. Although the earlier constitution of the Confederation did 
not have a provision on its revision, it was thought that it could be revised 
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only by the unanimous consent of each canton. The Swiss constitution-mak-
ers departed from this ‘unwritten rule’, rejecting the principle of unanimity 
of cantons in the revision of or adoption of the new federal constitution. As 
judged by Auer this was “a revolutionary act, founded both on power and on 
the agreement by the cantons which had lost the war to take part in the new 
scheme of government”.102 
Had the European constitution-makers had in view the American and Swiss 
experience with the adoption of the federal constitution, they would never have 
opted for unanimity as a condition for the EU Constitution coming into force, 
accompanied by the popular referendum as an instrument of ratiﬁ cation. 
The fact is that numerous members of the Brussels Convention have been 
conscious of the possibility that the Constitution will not pass on the referen-
dum hurdle in some states. The supporters of the popular referendum would 
submit to the Convention its proposal named ‘Referendum on the European 
Constitution’. In it they would insist that “if the Constitution is to have real 
democratic legitimacy, then it ought to be put to the people of Europe in a 
Europe-wide referendum”. To ratify the Constitution in some other way would, 
in their opinion, ‘’simply reinforce the impression of a deep democratic deﬁ cit 
in Europe” and “it would also send a signal that Europe is not about the people 
but about the governing elites”. According to the proposal, the referendum 
would be held on the same day as the elections for the European Parliament. 
In those states not having in their constitutions any provision on the popular 
referendum, at least a consultative referendum would be held. For ratiﬁ cation 
of the Constitution a double majority would be required - a majority of citizens 
and a majority of states. If the proposed Constitution would be rejected in any 
Member State, this state could repeat the referendum, regulate by a bilateral 
treaty with the ‘new’ European Union a special relationship, or simply secede 
from the Union.
In this way, two extremes are avoided: “no country can be forced under 
the new constitution against the will of its citizens, and on the other side one 
country alone cannot block the whole constitutional process by its veto”.103 The 
proposal is, essentially, similar to the one devised by the American constitu-
102 Andreas Auer, Why Europe needs a stronger legitimacy than the existing treaties, in 
Fabrice Filliez and Bruno Kaufmann ed., The European Constitution: Bringing in the 
People, The Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, Bern, 2004, pp. 39-40.
103 See Referendum on the European Constitution, CONV 658/03 of 31 March 2003. 
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tion-makers.104 This proposal for an all-European referendum has been signed 
by 92 delegates of the Convention,105, but in the end the existing ratiﬁ cation 
procedure was accepted, and because of that, as we know now, the destiny 
of the European Constitution was sealed. According to the double majority 
rule there is a great probability that the Constitution would be ratiﬁ ed - 14 
member states have already ratiﬁ ed the document (having a small majority of 
the overall EU population), and what is even more important, in the Member 
States where the referendum was chosen as an instrument of ratiﬁ cation the 
majority of voters voted for the Constitution (26.6 to 22 million). 
The whole historical experience with the direct popular voting on constitu-
tions in the framework of a federal/confederal system, from the ratiﬁ cation of 
the American Constitution 1787/8 untill the contemporary referendums on 
the European Constitution, conﬁ rms that it is no way certain that the people 
would accept the constitution, and that the ancient warning of Oliver Ellsworth 
- that people’s voting is better ﬁ tted to pull down than to build up Constitu-
tions - is still relevant today. 
The European analysts are looking at the causes of negative voting in the 
referendums principally in the belief that the people actually vote on the in-
ternal political issues of their country, or on conﬁ dence to the government, 
or simply against further integrative projects. Although I cannot elaborate on 
a different thesis here, I would like just to indicate it. Perhaps, the causes of 
negative voting of the people, when we speak about federal/confederal unions, 
should be searched in the fear of the people of a still more remote suprana-
tional government, which will in many ways affect their lives, but which would 
be much harder to control than the existing national government. With this 
remote central, imperial, or supranational government there is inseparatly 
connected the so-called ‘democratic deﬁ cit’, i.e. the whole spectre of problems 
linked to the implementation of representative or direct democracy. The op-
ponents of the American Constitution - called wrongly ‘Antifederalists’ - were 
104 Nine states needed for ratiﬁ cation of the Philadelphia Constitution had a minimal ma-
jority of population of the US at the time. The Draft Constitution recommended by the 
European Commision followed a similar pattern proposing that the EU Constitution 
would come into force after the declaration of three-fourths of the Member States af-
ﬁ rming the will of their people to stay in the Union. See European Commission, Feasibil-
ity Study: Contribution to a Preliminary Draft Constitution of the European Union.
105 See Honor Mahony, Ratiﬁ cation problems loom over Convention, Euobserver, 31 May 
2003.
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principally against one strong central government, which reminded them of 
the former imperial British government. Contemporary ‘Antifederalists’ in 
France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Denmark, or Sweden similarly look at 
the supranational institutions in Bruxelles. As simply put by Nils Lundgren, 
a Euro-sceptic member of the EP from Sweden: “People don’t like these E.U. 
structures. They are too far away, not transparent and undermining democracy 
by moving too much of the decision making process from the national parlia-
ments to the E.U.”106 
Some superﬁ cial comparisons of ratiﬁ cation of the American Constitution 
1787/88 with the French referendum 2005 show an impressive similarity. They 
show that the main centres of support for the American Constitution were in 
larger, urban and coastal environments, which were even in the 18th century 
America characterized by a higher level of commerce, education and cosmo-
politan spirit, and that the opponents of the Constitution predominated in 
rural environment, isolated from the commercial areas. Much more detailed 
analyses of voting on the French referendum show that the majority of the 
people in large cities, such as Paris and Lyon, voted for the EU Constitution, 
and in rural areas the majority voted against it.107 Does this pattern of voting, 
in the interval of more than two centuries, give sufﬁ cient ground for a claim 
that, generally, the support to a federal/confederal constitution be higher with 
the degree of urbanization, education, and openness of society? I cannot further 
elaborate on this hypothesis here, but I believe that there are enough indica-
tions present to justify further checking of my hypothesis. 
106 Closer Union or Superstate, Time, June 28, 2004. 
107 See Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Struggle for Europe, Dissent, Fall 2005, p. 14. Paul Hain-
sworth speaks about the voting division in ‘two Frances’ based on socioeconomic cri-
teria: one was more urban, wealthy, integrated, educated and successful; whereas the 
other was more marked by socioeconomic decline, unemployment, marginalization or 
exclusion”. On the French referendum see also P. Hainsworth, France Says No: The 29 
May Referendum on the European Constitution, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1, 
2006, pp. 105-108; Gilles Ivaldi, Beyond France’s 2005 Referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty: Second-Order Model, Anti-Establishment Attitudes and the End 
of the Alternative European Utopia, West European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1, January 
2006, pp. 47-69.
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PROPOSITION NO. 7:  THE NON-EXISTENT STRATEGY OF 
RATIFICATION 
It seems that the European constitution-makers did not consider some-
thing that could be called a strategy of ratiﬁ cation. I use the term according 
to the article of William Riker and Evelyn Fink on the strategy of ratiﬁ cation 
of the American Constitution, as devised by its proponents. Riker and Fink 
do not give their deﬁ nition of the ratiﬁ cation strategy, but this deﬁ nition, if 
we analyse their arguments, would encompass the choosing of the model of 
ratiﬁ cation, the speed of ratiﬁ cation, and the sequence of states in the ratiﬁ ca-
tion, acceptance of proposals of the opponents in a measure that would not 
affect the ratiﬁ cation in several states, speciﬁ c argumentation in support of 
the constitution adapted to different states, and ﬁ nally strong propaganda in 
favour of the constitution.108
The American constitution-makers carefully deliberated which model of 
ratiﬁ cation might be the best and most advantageous for the ratiﬁ cation. The 
debates on the Convention witnessed the deep conviction of the Framers that 
the content was very important for the destiny of the Constitution, but more 
important was to ensure easier and more likely ratiﬁ cation. This is evident from 
the following discussion of Nathaniel Gorham, on the advantages of ratiﬁ cation 
by conventions over the legislatures: 
“1. Men chosen by the people for the particular purpose, will discuss the 
subject more candidly than members of the Legislature who are to lose the 
power which is to be given up to the Genl. Govt. 2. Some of the Legisla-
tures are composed of several branches. It will consequently be more dif-
ﬁ cult in these cases to get the plan through the Legislatures, than thro’ a 
Convention. 3. in the States many of the ablest men are excluded from the 
Legislatures, but may be elected into a Convention. Among these may be 
ranked many of the Clergy who are generally friends to good Government. 
Their services were found to be valuable in the formation & establishment 
of the Constitution of Massachts. 4. the Legislatures will be interrupted 
with a variety of little business, by artfully pressing, which, designing men 
will ﬁ nd means to delay from year to year, if not to frustrate altogether the 
national system. 5 - If the last art: of the Confederation is to be pursued 
the unanimous concurrence of the States will be necessary.”109
108 See Evelyn Fink and William Riker, The Strategy of Ratiﬁ cation, pp. 220-55.
109 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, 2;90.
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In the end these arguments convinced the majority of delegates that the 
ratiﬁ cation by the people’s conventions was a less hazardous procedure than 
the ratiﬁ cation by the state’s legislatures. 
In the European Convention such debates pro et contra of different models 
of ratiﬁ cation, from the standpoint of its easier and more secure adoption, 
as far as I know, are missing.110 Those members of the Convention favouring 
the ratiﬁ cation by referendum have been for this option having in mind the 
argument of greater democratic legitimacy, and not greater probability of its 
adoption. Have the Convention made an analysis of earlier ‘European refer-
endums’, this analysis would indisputably show that the ratiﬁ cation of the 
constitution by popular referendum is much more hazardous than the ratiﬁ ca-
tion by parliaments.
One of the American constitution-makers would warn his colleagues dur-
ing the Philadelphia Convention that in the making of a constitution “a little 
practical virtue is to be preferred to the ﬁ nest theoretical principles, which 
cannot be carried into effect”.111 The European constitution-makers did not 
follow that recommendation, and neither did European politicians, insisting on 
the referendum option in their countries, even if this model was not constitu-
tionally required. If the political elite in France and the Netherlands thought 
more about a practical virtue of parliamentary ratiﬁ cation, and less about the 
value of legitimacy of popular approval, we would not speak of the European 
Constitution as a ‘political corpse’.
It is also indisputable that the European constitution-makers have made a 
huge mistake opting for the unanimous ratiﬁ cation of the Constitution. They 
should have proposed ratiﬁ cation by some qualiﬁ ed majority of Member 
States (e.g. four-ﬁ fths), as the American Framers had. At the beginning of the 
Convention James Wilson brought “the idea of not suffering a disposition in 
the plurality of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated 
by the inconsiderate or selﬁ sh opposition of a few (States)”, and therefore the 
ratiﬁ cation procedure had to be such “to admit of such a partial union, with a 
door open for the accession of the rest”.112
110 As pointed out by Wojciech Sadurski (citing Bruno De Witte): “The main fault of the 
Convention was that it focused all its attention on the substance of the new Treaty and 
none on the process of adopting it”. See Sadurski, The Union must be political, available 
at http://www.neweuropereview.com/English/Sadurski-English.cfm 
111 William Paterson, in Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention,1;258.
112 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, 1;123.
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 This attitude was accepted by the vast majority of delegates, concretizing it 
with the constitutional provision that the new Constitution would come into 
force when ratiﬁ ed by three-fourths of States of the existing Confederation, and 
be valid for those states only. It is important to say that with this provision the 
American constitution-makers did not want a ‘partial union’ and everlasting 
secession of those states not ratifying the Constitution. Instead, they calculated 
that the adoption of the Constitution in the ﬁ rst ten states would positively act 
on the acceptance of it in the other, more reluctant states, with the strongest 
opposition to the new federal system. It is the fact that the state of New York 
(whose delegation left Philadelphia), Rhode Island (whose delegation was not 
even present in Philadelphia, and whose citizens voted against the Constitution 
in the referendum) and North Carolina (whose ratiﬁ cation convention at ﬁ rst 
voted also against the Constitution) ratiﬁ ed the Constitution reluctantly, when 
it was already in force for the other 10 states. This shows that the strategy of 
ratiﬁ cation of the American constitution-makers has been correct.
Beside this, the American constitution-makers had very well devised and 
coordinated their activities in choosing the time and sequence of ratiﬁ cation 
in several states, although this was not easy in those times. So they carried 
out a quick ratiﬁ cation in some states, not letting the opposition organize (as 
in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts), they accomplished speedy and almost 
unanimous ratiﬁ cation in four small states (for which they correctly concluded 
that the membership in the new federal system was essential to their further 
survival), and for the end they left those signiﬁ cant states in which they expected 
the greatest opposition (Virginia and New York). In this way, the ratiﬁ cation 
convention in the most important and largest state Virginia, with strongly 
divided political elite on the issue of the Constitution, debated the Constitu-
tion at the moment when it was already accepted in nine states, which was 
the precondition of its coming into force. This fact was of great inﬂ uence in 
Virginia, and later in New York, securing the adoption of the Constitution in 
those states, although it is even today the prevalent opinion that the opponents 
of the Constitution in these states were in the majority both in the electorate, 
and in the state ratiﬁ cation convention.
It could not be disputed that the Intergovernmental Conference was 
cons cious of the possibility that the European constitution would not be 
unanimously ratiﬁ ed. In the last of 30 declarations which accompanied the 
Constitution it was prescribed: “The Conference notes that if, two years after 
the signature of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, four ﬁ fths 
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of the Member States have ratiﬁ ed it and one or more Member States have 
encountered difﬁ culties in proceeding with ratiﬁ cation, the matter will be re-
ferred to the European Council”.113 The problem with this Declaration is that 
it does not specify a possible solution - the Constitution transferred simply the 
problem of non-ratiﬁ cation to the chiefs of states and governments, with no 
guidelines what to do in this case.114 In that sense, the Declaration no. 30 on 
the ratiﬁ cation of the Constitution gave neither a legal, nor a political solution 
for the situation of non-ratiﬁ cation in one or more Member States.
PROPOSITION NO. 8: THE ABSENCE OF THE EUROPEAN 
VERSION OF THE FEDERALIST 
At the end of the Brussels Convention its president, in cooperation with 
both vice-presidents (Dehaene and Amato), published on the internet in 
November 2003 a shorter essay on the relations between the most popu-
lous and the least populous states of the European Union. In it they tried to 
prove that the ‘alleged struggle’ between the large and small states is based 
on “superﬁ cial understandings of the relations inside the European Union”, 
and that, with time, inside the Union there would be formed different groups 
of states, based on geographic, ideological, or economic criteria. By the way, 
the three of them would name their ﬁ rst essay “The European Union Convention 
Papers No. 1”, admitting they have chosen the name having in mind “Federalist 
papers”, written by Publius. The analogy was very signiﬁ cant - the three heads 
of the European Convention, mostly responsible for the ﬁ nal draft of the EU 
Constitution, would try, as Madison, Hamilton and Jay (although under the 
pseudonym) did, to explain to the European public why they should support 
the new Constitution. However, after this ﬁ rst essay, which obviously did not 
have the expected reception in the European public, d’Estaing, Amato and 
113 Declaration on the ratiﬁ cation of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Of-
ﬁ cial Journal of the European Union, C310/464.
114 A German analyst claims that the Declaration was intentionally so ambivalent because 
no one wanted, with a more detailed regulation of an extraordinary situation (the fail-
ure of ratiﬁ cation in one or more Member States), to provoke a possible constitutional 
ﬁ asco (a sort of “self fulﬁ lling prophecy”). I ﬁ nd such an explanation not quite logical. 
See Jürgen Schvarze, Der europäische Verfassungsvertrag, Juristen Zeitung, 23/2005, p. 
1130.
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Dehaene published nothing more.115 In this way, the European Constitution 
was left without a kind of modern version of the ‘Euro-Federalist’. I am not 
arguing that such a series of essays, published throughout Europe, would es-
sentially contribute to the commitment of the European public pro et contra the 
Constitution, because even today there is a polemic going on in the US about 
how much the essays in The Federalist contributed positively to the ratiﬁ cation 
of the American Constitution in the several states.116 However, The Federalist 
will always be admired because numerous analysts have found in it “the whole 
theory of American constitutional government”. These essays would seem to 
be “a window through which we may view the proceedings of the Philadelphia 
Convention and see how the system is supposed to work”.117 
There has been enough time, since the formulation of the Draft Constitu-
tion by the Brussels Convention, or since the preparation of the ﬁ nal proposal 
at the summit of EU leaders in June 2004 to write a similar, European version 
of The Federalist. The fact is that the European Constitution did not have a 
thorough, systematic, intellectually strong elaboration of its principles, which 
could be used by its proponents to convince the European public in the desir-
ability and necessity of the ratiﬁ cation and which would be read with the same 
respect across the Union. There is no work today containing ‘the whole theory 
of European constitutional government’ and trying to explain “how the system 
is supposed to work”. What has been published on the EU Constitution by the 
individual delegates would primarily be turned to the home public.118
Assessing retrospectively it seems that Larry Siedentop was right when he, a 
few years before the beginning of the greatest European constitutional project, 
115 See The European Union Convention Papers: Relations between the most populous and 
the least populous states of the European Union, available at http://europa.eu.int/futu-
rum/documents/other/oth131103_en.pdf.
116 See Larry Kramer, Madison’s Audience, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 112, 1998-9, pp. 
611-79.
117 Editor’s Introduction, in The Federalist, ed. George Carey and James McClellan, Liberty 
Fund, Indianapolis, 2001, pp. XLVI-XLVII.
118 See especially the book written by the Finish delegate Kimmo Kiljunen, The EU Con-
stitution - A Finn at the Convention, Publications of the Parliamentary Ofﬁ ce, 1/2004, 
and two short pamphlets of British ‘Eurosceptic’ members of the European Convention: 
Gisela Stuart, The Making of Europe’s Constitution, Fabian Society, London 2003, and 
David Heathcoat-Amory, The European Constitution and what it means for Britain, 
Centre for Policy Studies, London, 2004.
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asked: “Where are our Madisons?”, and “Why has Europe failed to generate 
a debate which approaches, in range and depth, the debate which developed 
around the drafting of a Federal Constitution for the United States”.119 Now, 
after the failure of the European constitutional experiment these questions 
have still a greater weight.
CONCLUSIONS
The failure of the project called ‘the European Constitution’ should not be 
surprising. The European constitution-makers have made so many mistakes 
in the process of its creation that, objectively speaking, it was hard to expect 
a different result. 
It depends mostly on the constitution-makers, in my opinion, what the 
product of constitution-making will be. They will not always be in a position 
to decide on the timing of the constitution-making (a constitutional moment), 
what the limits or qualiﬁ cations of their work will be, or who will decide on 
their proposal. However, the constitution-makers, as has been shown many 
times in the history of constitution-making, can determine in many ways not 
only the content of constitution, but also the method of its ratiﬁ cation. 
The errors of the European constitution-making are evident principally in 
- the beginning of the constitution-making process in the moment not suit-
able for the constitution-making,
- the ambiguity of the document regarding its constitutional or treaty char-
acter,
- creating the document completely unintelligible to a common citizen,
- making the Constitution without vision and ambition,
- complete absence of any strategy of constitutional ratiﬁ cation,
- insisting on direct involvement of the people in the acceptance of the 
Constitution, which was meant legally and politically principally as an 
international treaty,
- poorly managed media presentation and defence of the Constitution before 
the European public.
119 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 
27.
Zbornik PFZ, 57, (1) 119-167 (2006) 165
What is essential is that these errors are, in my opinion, very signiﬁ cant in 
explaining the failure of the European constitution. Had these mistakes been 
avoided, the result of the European constitution-making process could have 
been different and we would not speak today of a “dead” constitution.
It is true that the European constitution-makers, i. e. the members of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, could not choose the timing of the 
constitution-making process. They could not avail themselves of the genuine 
‘constitutional moment’, one of the essential preconditions of successful con-
stitution-making. However, all other mistakes they had made could have been 
avoided. Some of these mistakes are related to the constitutional document 
(the text that is completely unintelligible to a common citizen and without 
vision and ambition), and others are related, generally speaking, to the process 
of adoption of the constitution (absence of constitutional ratiﬁ cation strategy, 
insistence on the popular ratiﬁ cation, feeble defence of the Constitution). 
I would dare to say that avoiding just one, although fundamental, error in 
the constitution-making process, would have had huge consequences for the 
positive ratiﬁ cation of the European constitution. In the case of the European 
Constitution, the popular referendum has proved to be a dangerous instrument 
of democracy. There was, in my opinion, no need to bring into question the 
European constitution playing with a potentially very dangerous instrument 
of popular democracy, especially when there was no constitutional obligation 
to do so, and especially according to the rules most unfavorable for the ratiﬁ -
cation. If I could paraphrase the words of an American founding father - the 
European constitution-makers preferred the ﬁ nest theoretical principles to a 
little practical virtue.
The most preferred option, in my opinion, would be parliamentary ratiﬁ -
cation wherever possible. The ratiﬁ cation process would begin with a solemn 
declaration of the European Parliament accepting the Draft Constitution (its 
name would have to be, of course, somewhat different, e.g. ‘Basic Treaty’ or 
‘Basic Law’), which would then be sent to the national parliaments of the 
Member States. This would be followed by a quick ratiﬁ cation of the national 
parliaments, perhaps with an additional condition of a 2/3 majority of all rep-
resentatives voting for the constitution to be valid. The Constitution would 
enter into force upon acceptance of 4/5 of the Member States, i.e. at least 20 
of 25 countries. Only the second best option would be a popular referendum 
as a means of ratiﬁ cation, and only under certain conditions. These conditions 
are: to implement national referendums on the same day, preferably on the 
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same day as the European Parliament elections, and prescribing the principle 
of double majority (the majority of Member States and voters), and not higher 




OBJA©NJENJE PROPASTI EUROPSKOG USTAVA: 
USTAVOTVORNO GLEDI©TE
Temeljna je teza rada da glavni uzroci neuspjeha Europskog ustava proizlaze iz loπe 
pripreme i provedbe jednog kompleksnog procesa ustavotvorstva za savez dræava konti-
nentalnih razmjera. Taj proces ukljuËuje pitanja vremenskog aspekta ustavotvorstva, 
subjekta donoπenja ustava, strategije ustavne ratiﬁ kacije, ustavotvoritelje i konaËno sam 
ustavni tekst. O tim pitanjima nedostaje znaËajnija rasprava, πto je pogreπno, jer bi ti 
ustavni uzroci neuspjeha trebali biti pouËni za eventualni buduÊi europski proces usta-
votvorstva. Krucijalni uzroci neuspjeha Europskog ustava izlaæu se u obliku odreenih 
preliminarnih postavki. Prema miπljenju autora, prvenstvene pogreπke europskog usta-
votvorstva ogledaju se u zapoËinjanju ustavotvornog procesa u trenutku nepogodnom za 
ustavotvorstvo, u neodreenosti dokumenta glede njegova ustavnog ili ugovornog karaktera, 
u stvaranju ustavnog teksta potpuno neprimjerenog razumijevanju obiËnog graanina, 
u stvaranju ustava bez vizije i ambicije, u potpunoj odsutnosti bilo kakve strategije 
ustavne ratiﬁ kacije, u inzistiranju na neposrednom sudjelovanju naroda u prihvaÊanju 
ustava, koji je miπljen pravno i politiËki prvenstveno kao meunarodni ugovor, te u loπe 
voenoj medijskoj prezentaciji i obrani ustava pred europskom javnoπÊu. Najvaænija 
meu tim pogreπkama je ambivalentan pristup europskih ustavotvoritelja prema naËinu 
ratiﬁ kacije ustava, a nakon nje neuvaæavanje komparativnh iskustava ustavotvorstva 
drugih federalnih saveza.
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Zusammenfassung
Robert Podolnjak **
WARUM DIE EUROPÄISCHE VERFASSUNG SCHEITERTE -
DER VERFASSUNGSGEBENDE ASPEKT
Die Hauptthese dieser Arbeit besagt, dass die wichtigsten Ursachen für das Scheitern 
der europäischen Verfassung in der schlechten Vorbereitung und Umsetzung eines kom-
plexen Verfassungsgebungsprozesses für einen Staatenbund von kontinentalen Ausmaßen 
liegen. Dieser Prozess umfasst die Fragen des zeitlichen Aspekts der Verfassungsgebung, 
des Subjekts der Konstitutionalisierung, der Strategie der Verfassungsratiﬁ zierung, die 
Verfassungsgeber und schließlich den eigentlichen Verfassungstext. In diesem Bereich ist 
eine relevante Debatte ausgeblieben, was ein Fehler ist, da diese konstitutionellen Gründe 
des Scheiterns für einen künftigen europäischen Verfassungsgebungsprozess äußerst lehr-
reich sein könnten. Die zentralen Ursachen des Scheiterns der europäischen Verfassung 
werden hier in Form einiger im Vorfeld zu beachtender Kriterien vorgetragen. Der Autor 
sieht die vorrangigen Fehler der europäischen Verfassungsgebung darin, dass der Verfas-
sungsgebungsprozess zu einem hierfür ungünstigen Zeitpunkt aufgenommen wurde, dass 
das Dokument hinsichtlich seines Verfassungs- oder Vertragscharakters vage geblieben 
ist, dass der Verfassungstext sich dem Verständnis des gewöhnlichen Bürgers völlig entz-
ieht, dass die Verfassung jeglicher Vision und Ansprüche entbehrt, dass nicht einmal 
ansatzweise eine Ratiﬁ zierungsstrategie konzipiert wurde, dass darauf bestanden wurde, 
die Bevölkerung an der Verabschiedung einer Verfassung zu beteiligen, die rechtlich und 
politisch in erster Linie als völkerrechtlicher Vertrag gedacht war, und darin, dass die 
Verfassung gegenüber der europäischen Öffentlichkeit in den Medien schlecht präsentiert 
und verteidigt wurde. Der schwerwiegendste Fehler war jedoch der ambivalente Ansatz 
der europäischen Verfassungsgeber bezüglich des Ratiﬁ zierungsmodus, gefolgt von der 
Nichtbeachtung vergleichbarer Erfahrungen bei der Konstitutionalisierung anderer 
föderativer Staatenbunde.
Schlüsselwörter: Europäische Union, Europäische Verfassung, Konstitutionali-
sierung
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